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ABSTRACT
Reconciling theories of educational utopia: A case for an ambitious strategy for change
Roxanne Desforges
As the traditional concept of utopia consists of a blueprint for an ideal society, the 
conversation surrounding the question of utopianism in education has long been focused 
on theorizing educational change. Utopianism, however, has been widely criticized by 
those who find its concept problematic and its method practically ineffective. Without a 
utopia in sight, philosophers of education and policy-makers have been forced to consider 
other avenues of educational reform. The education community now questions whether 
there remains a place for utopian theorizing in education. 
This  thesis  argues  that  there  is  indeed  a  place  and  moreover,  a  need,  for 
utopianism in education. Increasingly, new conceptions of utopia are being offered to 
distance the notion from its objectionable aspects and salvage its aim of positive social 
change.  Yet  the  question  remains:  what  conceptions  of  utopianism might  enable  this 
transformation?
Iconoclastic utopianism, a less stringent and more exploratory strategy, has been 
heralded as a solution to the criticisms of blueprint utopianism. However, I question the 
ability of iconoclastic  utopianism to deliver  the change utopianism is  meant  to  bring 
about. I claim that by asserting universal ideals alongside the open-ended iconoclastic 
utopianism, a two-tiered strategy consisting of a layer of universal ideals, with an overlay 
of  iconoclastic  utopianism  can  better  provoke  real  social  and  educational  change.  I 
consider the ideals of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach as an example of the 
kind  of  strong ideals  that  can  bring  about  educational  change.  Ultimately,  I  ask that 
further inquiry be pointed in the direction of a two-tiered approach to educational utopia.
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While education remains a recognized driving force for social progress, there are 
increasing doubts as to whether it has the power to truly transform society. This doubt 
reflects a strain of pessimism that is prevalent in our contemporary world. Hope for social 
progress kept the belief in the transformative potential of education alive. Alas, in our 
late-capitalist society, neoliberal values have hijacked the meaning of hope. As Henry 
Giroux (2001) has observed,  the rhetoric  of hope has been distorted to  refer  to free-
market aspirations and is more often spoken of in terms of individual success rather than 
the achievement of collective goods for society. In this dystopian universe, Giroux (2003) 
attests, it has become more realistic to believe that the world will come to an end than 
that capitalism will.  Russell  Jacoby (1999, 2007) concurs  that we live in  an age that 
mistakes pessimism for realism. The utopian belief that people can change their society 
for the better is now equated with youthful naiveté and “utopianism” carries primarily a 
pejorative  connotation.  Our  conventional  wisdom  justifies  this  pessimism  by 
corroborating  that  “human  suffering  and  massive  inequalities  in  all  areas  of  life  are 
simply inherent in human nature and an irreversible part of the social condition” (Giroux, 
2006, p.52). These doubts, this perverted notion of hope, this cultural pessimism, are all 
functions of the anti-utopian attitude that characterizes our time.
Given  this  overall  pessimism,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  there  is  plenty  of 
concern for education. The critical chain that prompted the decline of utopianism also led 
to pessimism and finally, to apathy and disengagement—the crux of the problem (Bloch, 
1986; Halpin, 2003; Jacoby, 2007; Levitas, 2010a). There is no shortage of teachers who 
1
despair about the present and the future of education. While current reforms may lead to 
piecemeal  improvements,  they  do  not  attempt  to  challenge  the  reigning  cultural 
pessimism, effectively shortchanging the role of education for society. It is in light of this 
crisis of hope that the need for idealism, for social dreaming, is being raised anew. This 
need has translated into a desire to rescue utopian studies from the margins of research. 
In this essay, I argue that this need for new hope can be met by reinjecting the 
utopian spirit into today’s educational community. I argue that there is a potential for 
utopianism in education that remains largely unexplored. Broadly, the aim of this thesis is 
to reframe and vindicate the long debated role of utopianism in educational theory and 
practice, contributing to the resuscitation of the idealism dormant in educational thought. 
By re-establishing optimism as a respectable and defensible social  mood, perhaps the 
anti-utopian attitude may cease to impede hopeful and progressive educational thinking. 
It was not so long ago that hopes and dreams for social change were treated as 
serious prospects worthy of intellectual consideration. Education once burgeoned with 
grand,  ideal  visions  for  society.  Early  philosophies  of  education  presupposed  that 
education  could  bring  about  positive  social  change.  Educational  philosophies  were 
motivated by a social purpose and their aim was often an ideal—a vision of how the 
future ought to be. These visions were mapped out as plans for an ideal society—what we 
now  call  utopian  blueprints.  A  utopian  blueprint  depicts  a  design  that,  if  adopted 
wholesale,  will,  in  practice,  deliver  the  idealized  society.1 Plato  and  Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau  are  two  enduring  influential  figures  in  education  that  contributed  utopian 
1 When I use the term “utopianism” I am referring to the umbrella category of utopian thought, which encompasses a variety of 
disciplinary theory, literary satire, and imagination.
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blueprints, which combined social and educational hope for the future. 
Blueprint utopianism was a popular strategy of philosophers of education until the 
dramatic failure of one particular manifestation of utopian thinking. Soviet communism 
tarnished the word and its meaning for many inside and outside educational circles. A 
flood of criticism condemning utopianism followed.  Dissenters  began to interpret  the 
concept  of  utopia  to  be  problematic,  its  method  practically  ineffective  and  its  end 
unattainable.
As  utopian  theories  of  educational  change  fell  out  of  favor,  philosophers  of 
education and policy-makers alike were forced to consider other avenues of educational 
reform—avenues that might solve the real problems of students and teachers. Between 
the  dwindling  appeal  of  utopian  theorizing  and  the  unremitting  need  for  change,  an 
ameliorative strategy, whereby isolated bits of regulation and policy are unsystematically 
amended over time, has grown in popularity. Educational “tinkering” has become the go-
to  strategy  for  reform,  leaving  the  education  community  to  question  whether  there 
remains a place for the kind of idealism that utopian theories presuppose.
This  thesis  argues  that  there  is  indeed  a  place  and  moreover,  a  need,  for 
utopianism in education. Furthermore, as will become apparent, I do not stand alone in 
defense  of  utopianism.  Increasingly,  socially  concerned  thinkers  are  offering  new 
conceptions of utopia in an effort to distance the notion from its objectionable aspects and 
salvage  its  aim  of  positive  social  change;  not  to  mention  recover  its  concomitant 
optimism. Yet the question remains: what conceptions of utopianism might enable this 
transformation?
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I  will  first  engage  with  an  alternative  to  blueprint  utopianism,  iconoclastic 
utopianism. There are two instances of iconoclastic utopianism that I believe are worth 
the attention of educational theorists and practitioners. The first is theorized by David 
Halpin, as a socially integrated approach to utopia. Halpin (1999) formulated ‘utopian 
realism’ as a conceptual solution to the rampant cynicism and defeatism that continues to 
bog down advocates of educational and social change. The second is theorized by Henry 
Giroux.  Giroux (2001)  articulates  the  concept  of  ‘educated  hope’,  designed  with  the 
specific intention of preventing education from being swallowed whole by the values of 
neoliberalism. These contemporary theories of iconoclastic utopianism allow for a new 
way of understanding the potential of utopianism for society. Iconoclastic utopianism, as 
a conceptual tool and a creative process, carries with it new possibilities for educational 
application. I undertake to explore one such possibility in the theory of adult educator 
Budd Hall, who has demanded that new directions for utopia be investigated. Hall adopts 
an  iconoclastic  strategy in  conjunction with adult  learning practices  to  pursue a  new 
utopia. 
While iconoclastic theories of utopianism prove to create helpful opportunities for 
social change, they also have limitations. These limitations are especially obvious when 
compared to the blueprint strategy they were meant to replace. I will, therefore, argue that 
iconoclastic utopianism is an insufficient substitute for blueprint utopianism. The primary 
reason for the iconoclastic strategy’s disappointment is that it lacks the transformative 
force of the blueprint, which is made possible by its appeal to universal ideals, a principle 
the iconoclasts have purposely omitted. 
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In order to reconcile the need for social change with the need for an open and 
malleable utopian strategy, I suggest that the educational community begin to consider a 
two-tiered  utopian  theory.  The  theory  that  I  recommend  combines  a  foundation  of 
universal  ideals  with  an  overlay  of  the  iconoclastic  potential  for  further  utopian 
exploration.  As  an  example  of  which  universal  ideals  we  may  consider  adopting  in 
education, I point to Martha Nussbaum’s (1999) central capabilities. Ultimately, my hope 
is to attract members of the educational community to further inquire about and explore 
the potential of a two-tiered strategy for theorizing educational utopia.   
In formulating this call for utopianism in education, I will offer an account of the 
rise, the fall and the contemporary renaissance of utopian thinking in education. Chapter 
1 provides a historical overview of the relationship between utopianism and education. It 
highlights  the  prominent  role  blueprint  utopianism  has  played  in  two  of  the  most 
influential  philosophies  of  education,  namely  that  of  Plato  (1987)  and  Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau  (1993).  Chapter  2  recounts  how utopian  thinking  fell  out  of  favor  among 
educational theorists by outlining three of the most noteworthy criticisms of blueprints. 
Subsequently,  this  chapter responds to these objections by fleshing out an alternative 
theory of utopianism: iconoclastic utopianism. Finally, Chapter 3 offers an account of 
iconoclastic utopianism for educational practise. I also discuss some of the limitations of 
iconoclastic utopianism and offer considerations for future directions for utopianism in 
education.
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Chapter 1: Education’s utopian roots
Hopes and desires for social change have long been expressed in utopian writings. 
These writings have significantly impacted human life by raising questions, promoting 
critique and inspiring real change in the world. One aspect of human life that has received 
considerable attention from utopian writers is that of education. Likewise, some of the 
greatest contributions utopian thinking has made to society are represented in the history 
of educational thought.
The history of educational philosophy is deeply grounded in utopian thinking. The 
utopian element in an educational philosophy is the assertion that education is, above all, 
an ideal-driven means for social  change.  Though not  all  educational philosophies  are 
utopian, many of the pioneering works that remain influential to this day were. Among 
the most notable utopian philosophies of education are those belonging to Plato and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Both Plato and Rousseau theorized utopian blueprints for education.
Imagining a utopian blueprint involves a three-step cognitive process. First, one 
critiques and diagnoses the current state of reality. Second, in light of the diagnosis, one 
must posit an ideal reality. Having identified shortcomings and ideals, the third and final 
step is to map out a route from the present to the future ideal social order. Formulating a 
utopian blueprint involves articulating, with precision, the third and final step: creating a 
recipe  for  achieving  the  envisioned  ideal  state.  A  utopian  educational  philosophy  is 
therefore characterized by a critique of the status quo, an ideal-driven hope for the future, 
and a plan for making the ideal vision a reality.
In  keeping  with  tradition,  I  will  recount  Plato  and  Rousseau’s  educational 
6
philosophies  according to  the  blueprint  structure:  first,  I  will  explain  how they were 
dissatisfied with the social order to which they belonged and their criticisms of it; second, 
I  will  sketch how, in spite of their  realities, they envisioned an ideal world and they 
believed,  not  only in  an ideal  philosophy of  education,  but  also  that  education  itself 
would be a crucial factor in establishing and maintaining an ideal social order; lastly, I 
will  outline  the  disjunct  between  their  reality  and  the  ideal  that  motivated  them to 
construct a blueprint for a perfect social order. 
Lastly,  a word on the limitations of this chapter.  In the spirit  of their  utopian 
intentions, I will paint charitable pictures of these philosophies. This is not to say that I 
fail  to  acknowledge  their  ethically  problematic  elements,  which  are  primarily 
symptomatic  of  their  historically  situated  worldviews  or  that  I  endorse  these  views. 
However valid these objections may be, they remain outside the purview of the task at 
hand in Chapter 1, which is chiefly expository. It’s also important to note that no one 
utopian philosophy is the subject of this thesis, rather it is the very structure of utopian 
thinking and its unexplored potential for education that is the guiding interest. 
Plato’s Utopia (424/423 B.C.E. - 348/347 B.C.E)
Historical context
The events that lead up to Plato’s the Republic mark the end of a golden age in 
ancient Athens; a troubled time, as evidenced by a drawn-out war, political unrest and 
what is known as philosophy’s first and greatest tragedy, the execution of Socrates. Plato 
was born shortly after  the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in  approximately 429 
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B.C.E (Nagle, 2002, p.176). Athens, the once strongest city-state and birthplace of Plato, 
was greatly devastated by its struggle and eventual defeat by Sparta.
The  social  disintegration  that  would  follow  created  hopeless  conditions  for 
Athenian  life.  When  Athens  surrendered  in  404  B.C.E,  the  Spartans  replaced  the 
Athenian democracy with the oligarchy of the The Thirty and during this time, Athens 
remained in a state of civil war (Nagle, 2002, p.150). It wasn’t long before the oligarchy 
earned the epithet of “tyrants” from the Athenian people for significantly reducing the 
rights they had enjoyed under their former democracy. The Thirty Tyrants allowed only 
the  wealthy  to  vote  and  participate  in  legal  proceedings,  whereas  under  Athenian 
democracy these  rights  were  upheld  for  all  citizens  (Nagle,  2002,  p.150).  They also 
undertook to rid Athens of its most influential members; they exiled approximately 5000 
democrats,  executed  1500,  and imprisoned a  countless  number  (Nagle,  2002,  p.151). 
Though  this  repressive  regime  lasted  less  than  a  year,  Athens  had been successfully 
purged of many of its democratic leaders.
Against great odds, democracy was reinstated in Athens in 403 B.C.E. Though it 
appeared a more politically virtuous model of government, many were skeptical of this 
democracy for which strength and sophistry appeared to be its ruling principles. Socrates 
was one such dissident and his skeptical stance motivated the state to indict him. In 399 
B.C.E., Socrates was tried for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens (Nagle, 2002, 
p.176). As one of Athens’ most influential figures, Socrates chose to end his life rather 
than flee the home he loved and the home that had condemned him.
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Criticisms and Ideals
Plato  was  born  shortly  after  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  in 
approximately 429 B.C.E and witnessed the horrific events that befell Athens (Nagle, 
2002, p.176). The utopian tradition rises out of the very elements of Athenian life that 
challenged Plato to imagine a better state. Plato’s desire for social change stems from (at 
least)  three  aspects  of  life  during  his  time:  wartime  instability,  the  injustice  of  the 
democratic regime, and the popularity of sophism. I will briefly discuss each unsavory 
aspect of Athenian life in turn and the outline the ideals Plato affirms, which contrast 
sharply with the historical context. 
The  epoch  that  produced  the Republic was  by  no  means  short  of  social  and 
political tribulations. Having grown up in wartime Athens, Plato witnessed his city-state 
in constant strife through the Peloponnesian war to the civil war during the tyranny of 
The  Thirty.  During  this  time,  Athenians  lived  in  constant  fear  of  attack;  farmers 
abandoned their  homes  in  the  more  vulnerable  countryside  and sought  refuge  in  the 
central city of Attica (Nagle, 2002, p.147). Athenians watched as their homes went up in 
flames when the Spartans invaded rural Attica over the course of the twenty-seven year 
war  (Nagle,  2002,  p.  147).  Though  sheltered  within  the  city  walls,  Attica  became 
immensely over-crowded. Living conditions were dismal as the city depended on the 
navy to  deliver  food  into  the  city  and  a  horrific  plague  fell  upon  Athens  killing  an 
unprecedented number of people (Nagle, 2002, p.147). The ancient historian Thucydides 
describes Athenian life during the year of Plato’s birth as such:
An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country into the 
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city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As there were no houses to 
receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot season of the year in stifling cabins, 
where the mortality raged without restraint.  The bodies of dying men lay one 
upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round 
all the fountains in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which they 
had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had died there, just 
as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what was to 
become  of  them,  became  utterly  careless  of  everything,  whether  sacred  or 
profane. (Thucydides, 1943, p. 100-101)
The circumstances in Athens were further aggravated by the insecure political climate. 
Losing the war to Sparta culminated in the relinquishing of the democratic city-state. The 
political  shift  to  an  oligarchical  regime  disheartened  the  already  weak  and  defeated 
Athenians (Fisher, 1963, p.19). As an upper class and politically engaged citizen related 
to two members of The Thirty who tormented his city, Plato was deeply affected by these 
events and openly critical of them as well (Nagle, 2002, p. 178). The impact of civil  
turmoil on Plato cannot be understated. 
It took but a year for the rule of the Thirty Tyrants to be overthrown in 403 BCE. 
The reinstated democratic government was, however, hell bent on ridding Athens of any 
traces  of  the  Spartan  regime.  This  determination  created  a  democracy  of  mob-rule, 
resulting in the conviction and the death of Socrates. Plato (1987) was devastated by the 
treatment of Socrates under the rule of democracy and characterized it in the  Republic, 
years  later,  as  a  “regime  of  injustice”.  This  section  of  the  Republic also  contains  a 
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detailed  account  of  democracy’s  shortcomings  and  is  a  testament  to  how  deeply 
aggrieved Plato remained over the loss of Socrates. Describing democracy through the 
voice of his teacher, Plato (1987) denounces its excessively egalitarian quality, arguing 
that the average citizen is not equipped to rule and can not deliver justice to the state:
In the end they capture the seat of government, having discovered that the young 
man’s  mind  is  devoid  of  sound  knowledge  and  practices,  the  most  effective 
safeguards the mind of man can be blessed with...the vacant citadel in the young 
man’s mind is filled instead by an invasion of pretentious fallacies and opinions. 
(560b-c) 
Ruling, according to the  Republic, requires natural abilities and wisdom, a rare quality 
found  in  the  few who have  undergone  many years  of  schooling  and  philosophising. 
Simply allowing anyone to rule by virtue of their citizenship is what led to the execution 
of Socrates and what Plato (1987) argued would bring democracy to degenerate into a 
Tyrannical society.
Plato also took issue with the dominant educational and epistemological trends of 
his time. Isocrates, a notable sophist, founded a school in Athens a few years prior to 
Plato’s Academy, which had gained considerable popularity (Nagle, 2002, p.178). For 
sophists, education was a matter of successful argumentation and therefore, truth was not 
absolute but treated as a function of rhetoric. What was true or right, according to the 
sophists, was whatever one could be convinced of. This education, therefore, specialized 
in  rhetoric,  expression,  persuasion  and  coherent  argumentation.  Education  for  these 
students was a purely practical and political endeavor and was offered by the Sophists on 
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a for-profit basis. Isocrates believed his model created better statesmen than Plato’s, and 
the  population  seemed  to  agree—sophistry  would  in  fact  remain  the  dominant 
educational  model  in  ancient  Greece  (Nagle,  2002,  p.178).  
In  the  face  of  these  hardships,  Plato  sought  to  overcome  the  socio-political 
instability of his time by idealizing the principle of Justice, which serves as the guiding 
principle of his utopian vision. Justice, for Plato, is good in itself (not just for what it 
produces) and can characterize both individuals and communities. He explains that a just 
individual is one with a just soul. Justice in the soul prevails when the soul’s three parts
—reason,  spirit  and  appetite—are  in  harmony.  This  occurs  when reason  manages  to 
govern spirit and appetite, resulting in a harmonious soul and a happy person (Melchert, 
p.148-149). 
Justice  in  the  soul  is  correlated  to  justice  in  the  community.  For  Plato,  the 
community consists of members with distinct natural functions. He outlines three classes 
of  citizens:  the  laborers  correspond to  the  appetitive  part  of  the  soul,  the  auxiliaries 
correspond to spirited part of the soul and the governing members accord with reason. 
For Plato, this last group is the only class that can pursue wisdom (knowledge of what is  
true)  and  it  is  wisdom above  all  that  Plato  believes  should  be  used  to  rule  society. 
Therefore, a just city is one where members of society fulfill a role according to their 
nature (Plato, 1987, 433a). In other words, the laborers labor, the auxiliaries police, and 
the  guardians  govern,  and  no  class  interferes  with  the  other.  Such  a  society,  Plato 
believed, would run harmoniously, with members actualizing their potential. Justice of 
the city is this ordered state.  
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Plato also explains that the ideal state would prize its philosophers rather than 
execute them—the philosophers were to be the governing class, delivering justice to the 
state and establishing social harmony. Without the philosopher-king, Plato believed that 
democracy would beget tyranny:
The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of 
day,  and there will  be no end to the troubles of the state,  or indeed, my dear 
Glaucon, of humanity itself, till philosophers become kings in this world, or till 
those we now call  kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and 
political power and philosophy thus come into the same hands, while the many 
natures now content to follow either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly 
debarred from doing so. This is what I have hesitated to say for so long, knowing 
what a paradox it would sound; for it is not easy to see that there is no other road 
to real happiness, either for society or for the individual. (473d-e)
Plato founded his school, the Academy, in opposition to the dominant educational 
tradition of sophism. The Academy featured an educational system that pursued Truth 
above  all.  Plato  developed  the  Theory  of  Forms  as  a  kind  of  solution  to  the 
epistemological conflicts that plagued Athenians. For Plato, the Forms are abstract ideas 
that are the essences of things in the world (e.g. the Form of the Good is the ultimate 
source of all goodness in the world). By instantiating a theory of Forms, which were the 
sources of truth and reality, Plato thought it would be possible for disagreements among 
citizens to be resolved through objective knowledge of what is absolutely and universally 
true (Fisher, 1963). In addition, if rulers possessed absolute Truth (i.e. knowledge of the 
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eternal forms), Plato believed they could ensure a just city-state.
The Blueprint
Plato wrote  The Republic in approximately 375 B.C.E as a Socratic dialogue, a 
work of fiction that addresses the very real problems Athenians were facing. On Plato’s 
map to utopia, his ideals of Justice, the societal role of the philosopher, and absolute 
Truth mark the spot.  In order to arrive there,  Plato’s blueprint asserts that three bold 
political proposals must be met—first, that women should be equal members of the the 
ruling guardian class of citizens; and second, that the family should be abolished so that 
every citizen may be a brother or a sister to one another, and third, that political power 
should belong to philosophers (Plato, 1987, 453c, 457d, 473d). This final proposal is 
made according to the aforementioned principle that each member of the city must play 
the role that best suits his or her nature in order for the polis to run harmoniously. An 
individual can fulfill this role only if they have both the adequate potential and if they are 
educated  on  Plato’s  terms  to  become  a  knowledgeable  and  well-rounded  citizen. 
Education is thus the vehicle for satisfying the third proposal of Plato’s blueprint and is 
therefore essential to the establishment of his utopia.
The philosopher is  a lover of wisdom, one with the eternal  knowledge of the 
Forms, which is to say that the philosopher understands reality as it truly is. With this 
knowledge, philosophers are best suited to rule the ideal state, as Socrates indicates when 
he poses the following rhetorical question:
Can you, then, possibly find fault with an occupation for the proper pursuit of 
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which  a  man  must  combine  in  his  nature  good  memory,  readiness  to  learn, 
breadth of vision and grace, and be a friend of truth, justice, courage, and self-
control?...grant, then, education and maturity to round them off, and aren’t they 
the only people to whom you would entrust your state? (Plato, 1987, 487a). 
The blueprint for Plato’s ideal state consists mainly of the delineating the necessary path 
to becoming a philosopher-ruler—he or she who will deliver justice. This path begins 
with being born into the guardian class and the rest consists of a very specific education. 
The aim of education, for Plato, is to produce good citizens and above all, philosopher-
kings.
Plato places the responsibility of education in the hands of the state. Education is 
the state’s first obligation if it is to ensure justice. Every citizen of the Republic was to 
receive an education. By educating all children, the state can see to it that individuals 
select  appropriate  career  paths  and  that  those  with  leadership  potential  are  trained 
accordingly (Fisher, 1963, p.33).
Education, for Plato, is a means of shaping the minds, bodies and characters of the 
citizens of the state. Both physical and intellectual training impact character development 
and  both  are  required  in  order  to  form a  balanced  character;  as  Socrates  observes, 
“excessive emphasis on athletics produces an excessively uncivilized type, while a purely 
literary training leaves men indecently soft” (Plato, 1987, 410d). Additionally,  Plato’s 
pedagogical method, for which he is famous, does not ask the educator to “put into the 
mind knowledge that wasn’t there before” but rather, the role of the educator is to direct 
individuals to think and know things for themselves (Plato, 1987, 518c). For this reason, 
15
the Socratic Method of educational facilitation is  a key ingredient in ensuring proper 
philosophical development.
There are three significant discussions of education present in the Republic. In 
Part III, the compulsory education of all citizens is discussed. Only those with potential 
were  to  receive  the  additional  and  voluntary  schooling  necessary  to  become  a 
philosopher-ruler,  and  the  specifics  of  this  education  are  discussed  in  Part  VIII. A 
metaphorical  account  of  education  is  also  offered  in  “The  Allegory  of  the  Cave”, 
presented in Part VII. This allegory depicts the transformative experience of education 
for  the  guardian.  Before  closing  my account  of  Plato’s  blueprint,  I  will  recount  the 
necessary curriculum that makes up the educational journey of a philosopher-ruler as well 
as the broader, metaphorical journey depicted in the allegory. 
 Three  levels  of  schooling  make  up  Plato’s  ideal  educational  system.  The 
intellectual content of each level goes as follows: The level equivalent to our primary 
school teaches reading and writing. The level equivalent to our secondary school teaches 
literary  education  through  poetry  and  music.  History,  religion,  citizenship,  cultural 
studies and moral education were all taught through the same literary texts.2 Finally, at 
the  Academy,  students  direct  their  attention  toward  mathematics,  science,  and 
philosophy,  which  Plato  refers  to  as  “dialectic”  or  a  method  of  dialogue  involving 
2 Plato believed that many popular texts, in their attempts to enthrall the reader, sacrificed the 
truth regarding the gods and morality and were therefore, unsuitable for youth. Plato believed the 
depictions of the gods in the works of Homer and Hesiod to be a harmful influence on the youth of Athens:
 Nor can we permit stories of wars and plots and battles among gods; they are quite untrue, and if 
we want our prospective guardians to believe that quarrelsomeness is one of the worst evils, we must 
certainly not let them be told the story of the Battle of the Giants...On the contrary, if we are to persuade 
them that no citizen has ever quarrelled with any other, because it is sinful, our old men and women must 
first tell children stories with this end in view...” (1987, p.132-33). Plato believed that stories participate in 
shaping the character of a child. Even if the intention of a story is allegorical they were to be omitted from 
educational use because young people could not yet detect such literary nuance (Plato, p.133). 
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antagonistic questioning from which truths reveal themselves organically.  
The education of the philosopher-king is designed to test the philosophical nature 
of  the  individual.  The  objective  of  this  education  is  to  develop  the  ultimate  virtue, 
knowledge of the Form of the Good (Plato, 1987, 505a).  The study of mathematics plays 
a crucial initial role in this endeavor because the solution of an equation is not a subject 
up for debate; it is absolute knowledge. Mathematics does not admit of opinion, which is 
a  lower  form  of  knowledge  according  to  Plato  (1987,  p.310,  refer  to  diagram). 
Mathematics also allows the student to harness their abstract reasoning skills  that are 
required for understanding the Form of the Good or any form at all, as universality is 
itself an abstract notion. 
Unlike the Sophists, Plato did not glorify the training of rhetoric, for he believed 
that one could not be successfully trained in it without abusing it. In fact, prior to learning 
how to convince anyone of anything, one must understand how society functions. The 
philosopher-king’s education is intended to teach a true love of learning. Dialectics, a 
true  philosophical  act,  is  reasoning through dialogue that  consists  of  an exchange of 
questions and answers, much like we find in Plato’s dialogues. This process allows one to 
develop one’s knowledge of the world and the self. This educational phase goes on until 
the guardian is  over thirty years  old (Plato,1987,  537d).  At this  point,  they can hold 
political office and gain experience while continuing to test themselves. It is only by age 
50 that those outstanding philosophers can begin to also rule the republic (Plato, 1987, 
540b). In ruling, they are tasked with engaging citizens as Socrates did in the polis, to 
guide them towards Truth and towards the Good: 
17
And when they are  fifty,  those who have come through all  our  practical  and 
intellectual tests with distinction must be brought to their final trial, and made to 
lift their mind’s eye to look at the source of the light, and see the good itself, 
which they can take as a pattern for ordering their own life as well as that of 
society and the individual. For the rest of their lives they will spend the bulk of 
their time in philosophy, but when their turn comes they will, in rotation, turn to 
the weary business of politics, and for the sake of society, do their duty as Rulers, 
not for the honour they get by it but as a matter of necessity. (Plato, 1987, 540b, 
p.354)3
This educational path, from childhood to rulership, is imparted metaphorically in 
the Allegory of the Cave, which summarizes Plato’s core thoughts on the educational 
process. In this famous passage of the Republic, Socrates offers an analogy between the 
education of a potential philosopher-king to that of a prisoner of a cave:
Imprisoned in a cave, a group of people have been chained down, forced to spend 
their lives immobile. At a distance behind them, a fire blazes. In between the men 
and the fire lies a passageway, along which people carry figures of men, animals 
and other objects raised above their heads. The light of the fire projects  these 
figures onto the only wall the prisoners can gaze upon Unaware that the shadows 
are mere images, the prisoners believe that these projections are the real things 
(Plato, 1987, 514a-515c).   
Socrates  supposes  now  that  a  prisoner  is  compelled  to  turn  around,  away  from the 
3
 It is interesting to note that it seems that for Plato the act of teaching/facilitating and the act of ruling are 
almost the same. 
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shadows. When the prisoner is liberated, he sees the fire and the figures but nonetheless 
still  holds the shadows to be more real.  Reaching the surface and stepping out in  to 
nature, the prisoner becomes skeptical of his previous reality. Finally, gazing upon the 
sun, the prisoner eventually realizes that the sun “produces the changing seasons and 
years  and controls  everything in  the  visible  world,  and is  in  a  sense responsible  for 
everything  that  he  and  his  fellow-prisoners  used  to  see”  (Plato,  1987,  516b-c).  The 
prisoner then becomes aware of the fact that he was not experiencing the the world as it 
truly is, all along. 
Socrates says that the people in the cave are like members of the polis. They see 
images but they think they are seeing reality. Ordinary people treat the visible world as 
the prisoners treat the images— they unhesitatingly trust the reports they receive from 
their senses. Education, in this account, is turning around from the images and facing 
something else. Plato (1987) wants to convey that turning around requires a certain force, 
a prisoner must be “compelled” to do so (515c). It is by no means easy to accomplish 
this. Education, similarly, involves coming to terms with the fact that what one assumes 
to be true is not always the case. 
The sun is analogous to the Good in this story. Just as the prisoner reaches the 
sun, the student becomes the philosopher reaching the Good. For Plato, education is a 
transformative experience; it requires work and involves pain. The discomfort at work 
here is the kind that is made manifest through the Socratic method. The Socratic method 
makes one uncomfortable with conventional thinking. It demands that one think for one’s 
self through what appear to be simple questions. The realization that one does not have 
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knowledge can be agonizing and not everyone is capable of overcoming this stage of the 
educational process. The ability to do so is the mark of a philosopher. In other words, 
education enables the transformation from being an individual for whom reality is the 
second-rate visible realm, into being an individual of knowledge, for whom reality is the 
intelligible realm of mathematics and the forms.
Turning back to the question of the purpose of this blueprint, the social order 
Plato believes can be achieved by educating the citizenry in the Republic is specifically 
designed to meet the challenges he lived through. This philosophy would become the 
mission statement of the Academy. Through the Academy, Plato hoped to implement the 
ideals outlined in the Republic. 
Before Plato, state institutions had seldom been the object of written criticism and 
reform. In fact, the notion that a more perfect reality can be theorized and pursued, a 
distinctly utopian notion, may be, in part, a result of Plato’s critical method (Fisher, 1963, 
p.20).  For  this  reason,  Plato  is  one  of  the  wellsprings  of  the  utopian  tradition.  The 
Republic can aptly be called the first utopian educational treatise, laying the groundwork 
for future philosophers, such as Rousseau, to continue the tradition.
Plato’s philosophy certainly served as a benchmark for Rousseau. In Book 1 of 
Emile, Rousseau (1993) praises the Republic as, “le plus beau traité d’éducation qu’on  
ait jamais fait” (p.6). Rousseau, like Plato, theorizes education in tandem with a vision of 
politics that substantiates the notion that the underlying purpose of education is to shape 
society.  
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Utopia (1712-1778)
Historical Context
Born in Geneva, Switzerland in 1712, Jean-Jacques Rousseau grew up as the Age 
of  Enlightenment  was  blossoming  in  Europe.  The  Enlightenment  worldview  was 
characterized  by  a  turn  away  from  faith-based  explanations  and  an  emphasis  on 
empiricism and reason for forming understandings. Favoring empiricism meant adopting 
the practices of natural science to investigate the world. Favoring reason meant turning to 
critical and rational thinking to answer questions about the world, while adopting a more 
conservative  view  of  the  limits  of  our  human  understanding.  These  inclinations 
converged  in  the  wake  of  the  scientific  revolution  to  inspire  the  most  definitive 
Enlightenment concept, the scientific method. The scientific method could explain the 
world in ways that sacred texts could not, and indeed often explained the world better 
than  scripture.  The  laws  of  both  human  society  and  nature  became  humanity’s  to 
uncover, which led to the birth of social science. The emergence of science went hand in 
hand  with  the  Enlightenment’s  obsession  with  the  notion  of  progress—the  idea  that 
society could be improved through an understanding of the laws that govern human life 
and that furthermore, society and its institutions could be redesigned with this knowledge. 
It  was  believed  that  better  societies  and  better  people  would  result  from intellectual 
progress (McKay, et. al., 2003, p. 667). Universal solutions to man’s problems were the 
aim of both science and philosophy. With this in mind, it is clear that the utopian projects 
were closely in harmony with the overall Enlightenment project. Not surprisingly, the 
Enlightenment period was the high water mark for blueprint utopianism. 
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While Enlightenment intellectual history is impressive even by today’s standards, 
many aspects of Enlightenment social life leave much to be desired, family life being one 
such aspect.   Regardless of social  class,  during the eighteenth century many children 
were  of  very  little  consequence  to  their  parents.  In  fact,  the  French  moralist 
Vandermonde was recorded to have said, “one blushes to think of loving one’s children” 
(Lorence, 1974, p.1). The absence of feeling and care for children is thought to be a result 
of the high child mortality rate of the time (McKay et. al., 2003, p. 668). Medical care for  
children was still such that one in five newborns was sure to die (McKay et. al., 2003, p. 
666).  Doctors and members of the clergy would urge parents not to become emotionally 
invested  in  their  children  (McKay et.  al.,  2003,  p.668).  This  neglect  and  emotional 
detachment often also led to child abuse. Attention came from parents more often for the 
sake  of  discipline  than  affection  (McKay,  et.  al.  2003,  p.  668).  This  sentiment  is 
expressed in the writing of Susannah Wesley who argued that the duty of the parent is to 
“conquer the will [of the child], and bring them to an obedient temper” (Greven, 1973, 
p.47-48). That is, the underlying belief about children was that only through control could 
they become good. This is a reflection of the Christian notion that human beings are by 
nature  wicked;  Thomas  Hobbes,  in  his  Leviathan (1951)  added  that  man  requires 
structure, governing authority, and civilization to be good. In sum, child-rearing in the 
eighteenth century involved an attitude of indifference, and physical discipline. 
During Rousseau’s time, formal education was also becoming more common in 
Europe. This was in large part due to the rise of religious toleration as literacy became a 
tactic  of  religious  competition.  Churches  of  all  denominations  began  to  involve 
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themselves  with  the  education  of  the  people,  and  both  the  Catholic  and  Protestant 
traditions encouraged people to learn to read using their own scripture (McKay et. al., 
2003, p.  670).  Popular education was basically the outcome of churches’ attempts to 
instruct the faithful in sound doctrine. The presence of dissident sects (Jansenists and 
Protestants  in  France;  Presbyterians  and  Quakers, in  England)  made  competition  for 
hearts  and  minds  an  uncomfortable  fact  for  national  churches.  Nonetheless,  many 
children would never learn to read. 
Criticisms and Ideals
Historically, Rousseau is thought of as a principal figure of the Enlightenment 
because  he  contributed  several  of  his  period’s  most  resounding  philosophical  works, 
among them Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men, The Social Contract and 
Emile. Yet interestingly, Rousseau was also one of the Enlightenment’s greatest critics as 
he was utterly disenchanted with its reigning principles. Three principles with which he 
took  great  issue  were  the  Enlightenment’s  dominant  theory  of  human  nature,  the 
dominant  governing structure  of  society and the  adherence to  reason above all  other 
sources of justification. In targeting these ideas, Rousseau addressed his criticisms to the 
philosophers who held them, which is to say that Rousseau’s collegial friendships were 
often short lived (Kenny, 2006, 94-95).4 Despite the strong opposition with which his 
criticisms and ideals were met, Rousseau’s work provoked the ideological shift toward 
Romanticism.
4
 Among them were Diderot, Hume and Voltaire.
23
Though competing theories of human nature existed during the Enlightenment, 
Rousseau believed Thomas Hobbes’ position, which had remained relevant for over a 
century after his death, to be the most offensive. The Hobbesian legacy asserted that life 
without government would consist of all out war and as the famous passage goes, in the 
state of nature:
there  is  no  place  for  industry;  because  the  fruit  therefore  is  uncertain;  and 
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities 
that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, 
and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the 
earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all,  
continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes, 1986, p. 84)
Hobbes (1986) paints a dark picture of the natural state of mankind which he justifies by 
identifying three principles which would be cause for quarrel among men: competition, 
diffidence and glory. Without government, there is no justice and no law (Hobbes, 1986). 
There is however, a law of nature, a force in every human being to preserve through his 
or her own life—the “law of the jungle”, as it is often put. Without a social contract in 
place to create rational incentive for people to abstain from violence, an anarchic state 
prevails.
While Hobbes and Rousseau both agreed that European civilization was marred 
by greed and vanity,  they disagreed as  to  why that  was.  Hobbes believed that  these 
sentiments are innate; Rousseau, however, argued that human beings are not essentially 
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vain and greedy but that these dispositions are the product of unjust social institutions. 
Furthermore, Rousseau (2011) believed that society corrupted the naturally good human 
nature (p.32). Rousseau, therefore, idealized the state of nature that preserved the moral 
character of man and assigned to education the role of protecting the individual from all 
that might taint its perfection.
Rousseau  also  condemned  the  popular  belief  that  enlightened  absolutism  or 
enlightened despotism, as it is sometimes called, was the ideal political model for social 
and legal reform (Israel, 2011, p. 270). Voltaire is one proponent of the Enlightenment 
who subscribed to the theory that good and progressive governance would result from an 
enlightened monarchy under the advisement of an enlightened court.  He believed that 
political reforms should be imposed by well-educated and knowledgeable rulers, such as 
Catherine the Great,  whom Voltaire  endlessly praised in his  correspondence with her 
(Israel, 2011, p. 271). Voltaire, and many other Enlightenment thinkers (Turgot, Hume, 
Alembert, Goethe) believed enlightened despotism to be the only viable solution to the 
old self-interested despotism:
many believed such rulers embodying the principles of law, justice, toleration, 
and  the  responsibilities  of  the  state  had  already  virtually  banished  the  old 
unthinking  despotism  and  intolerance  holding  ‘sous  le  joug  d’une  servitude 
absolue  nos  ancêtres’  as  one  moderate  enlightener  expressed  it  and  that  ‘la 
philosophie’ had thereby gained impressive ground. (Israel, 2011, p. 273)
Voltaire, however, was not desperate for fundamental political,  social or legal reform 
(Israel 2011, p.275). Having had the good fortune of every of life’s comforts, it is no 
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surprise that Voltaire did not see eye to eye with Rousseau, who was far less wealthy than 
Voltaire.  
  Rousseau vehemently disagreed with the blatant authoritarianism of monarchy, let 
alone  absolutism.  Believing  freedom to  be  one  of  humanity’s  most  important  rights, 
Rousseau held that the only way to protect it was to put sovereignty in the hands of the 
people—the central aim of the Social Contract (Fisher, 1963, p.128). Rousseau idealized 
egalitarianism and believed that it was the people who needed to be enlightened so that 
their general will could rightly govern. For Rousseau, education would serve to ensure 
the kind of moral citizens that could function in the model of government he foresaw.
Lastly,  Rousseau  also  attacked  the  enlightenment's  most  quintessential 
convictions: its faith in reason, moderation and progress. Rousseau believed that these 
forces destroyed rather than liberated the individual (McKay et. al., 2003 p.612). As I 
have already explained, Rousseau believed human being to be fundamentally good in 
nature; however, he also observed that “men are wicked; a sad and constant experience 
makes proof unnecessary” (1997, p.197). In 1751, Rousseau wrote the essay that would 
earn  him his  counter-Enlightenment  reputation  namely,  “Discourses  on  the  Arts  and 
Sciences”. Therein, Rousseau argues that the progress of the arts5 and sciences negatively 
impacts human beings, their virtue, their morality and their happiness. Four years later, 
Rousseau wrote Discourse on the origin and foundation of inequality among men, which 
also espoused the theme that humanity had been corrupted by societal institutions.6 In 
5
 What is meant by “arts” here is something more along the lines of crafts than fine arts. “Arts and Sciences” 
is meant to encompass all aspects of intellectual culture. 
6
 To demonstrate the extent of Rousseau and Voltaire’s antagonism, when Rousseau sent Voltaire a copy of 
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sum, one thesis that can be extracted from these works is that life has not improved or 
progressed  with  its  cultural  advances  but  rather,  these  advances  have  suppressed  the 
natural goodness of man. Humanity’s goodness is debased in part because virtue takes a 
backseat to wealth accumulation in civilization—Rousseau writes, “what will become of 
virtue when when one has to get rich at all costs? The ancient politicians forever spoke of 
of morals and virtues; ours speak only of commerce and money” (Rousseau, 1997, p.18). 
The desire for money motivates the cultivation of reason and wit over the virtues of 
honesty, frugality, and courage. This is reflected in the rewards attributed to the former in 
society and in education. “From our very first years,” Rousseau writes,
a senseless education adorns our mind and corrupts our judgment. Everywhere I 
see huge establishments, in which young people are brought up at great expense 
to learn everything except their duties. Your children will not know their own 
language, but will speak others that are nowhere in use...they will not know the 
meaning  of  the  words  magnanimity,  equity,  temperance,  humanity,  courage... 
(Rousseau, 1997, p.22)        
It is important to note that Rousseau is not anti-intellectual by any means, as it is  
not the arts and sciences in and of themselves that he disparages but what he believes are 
their direct causal outcomes. Later, Rousseau would argue similarly about the role of 
reason,  insofar  as  reason  trumps  emotion  and  makes  people  disinterested  in  virtue. 
Socialization, Rousseau argues, teaches us to manage our emotions, our most instinctive 
thoughts and feelings further distancing man from his nature.
Discourse, Voltaire wrote him back taunting, “I have received your book against the human race” (Kenny, 
2006, p.94).
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 Rousseau sought to correct man’s corrupted nature by protecting the basic good 
of the child from the refinements of civilization. Rousseau’s solution is to turn away from 
civilization, authoritarianism and reason and turns toward nature, egalitarianism, freedom 
and virtue. The latter ideals are put to work in Emile. Subsequently, Emile and the ideals 
contained  therein  would  greatly  influence  the  Romantic  movement  that  rebelled  and 
overturned the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. 
The Blueprint
Rousseau  follows  in  the  Platonic  tradition  of  formulating  utopian  theories  of 
society  wherein  the  role  of  education  figures  prominently.  In  the  Social  Contract, 
Rousseau  articulates  his  grand  ideal  theory  of  society.  However,  it  is  his  other 
philosophical treatise, Emile: Or on Education, which he wrote simultaneously, in which 
Rousseau offers his blueprint for education. There is also, certainly, a correlation between 
the  educational  blueprint  in  Emile  and the  societal  blueprint  in  Social  Contract.  The 
education  delineated  in  Emile culminates  in  the  student  reading  the  Social  Contract, 
conveying to the reader the primacy of the educational blueprint to the overall political 
project. 
 Emile is the theoretical account of a regular boy’s ideal education from birth to 
adulthood,  the aim of  which is  to  protect  the naturally good nature of  the young by 
allowing them to develop on their own accord. For Rousseau (1993), a man’s education is 
what shapes him: “all that we lack at birth, all that we need when we come to man’s 
estate, is the gift of education” (p.6). Emile’s education spans Books I through V, in 
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chronological  order  of  developmental  stage.7 Each  stage  depicts  his  mental  and 
physiological growth by highlighting a new aspect of Emile’s capabilities. This growth is 
determined by the forces of “nature, men, and things”, according to Rousseau (1993, p.6). 
By nature, Rousseau means the natural growth the student undergoes physiologically and 
psychologically.  From others  (“men”),  humans  learn  what  to  do  with  their  growing 
bodies  and faculties  and what  is  learned through experience  with the  environment  is 
learned through one’s interaction with things (1993, p.6). “Nature”, is the guiding force 
to which the other two must cede (1993, p.6). The role of the tutor is to ensure that they 
do not conflict with one another. The company the child keeps, as well as the things the 
child comes into contact with, need to be moderated, but mainly education consists in 
letting nature take its course. In doing so, education amounts to the cultivation of the 
child’s natural goodness by avoiding civilisation and its byproducts, at least until one is 
prepared  to  interact  with  them  without  falling  prey.  Therefore,  the  first  step  to  a 
Rousseauvian education is to raise children in the country (1993, p.26). After all,  for 
Rousseau (1993) ideal education is both in nature and according to nature; the outcome of 
which will be a man that is good for himself and for others (p.9). 
The child’s development takes place in four stages: 1) from birth to age two, 2) 
from age two to twelve, 3) age twelve to fifteen, and 4) from fifteen to twenty years old. 
Rousseau elaborated a set of developmentally appropriate prescriptions for each stage. 
According to Rousseau (1993), “man’s education being at birth; before he can speak or 
understand he is learning” and so, Stage I begins at birth (p.29). There are two important 
7
 Book V also treats the education of Sophy, Emile’s female counterpart. 
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guidelines for this stage. The first is to prevent the adoption of habits. At this point, the 
child is limited to affective thoughts and is aware of only pleasure and pain (Rousseau, 
1993). Recurring experiences cause the child to develop habits, and habits create desires 
in the child above their natural needs (Rousseau, 1993). Rousseau (1993) notes, “the only 
habit the child should be allowed to contract is that of having no habits” (p.30). The 
second guideline is to ensure the child’s freedom of movement. Stage I, then, asks the 
tutor not to shelter the child from danger or discomfort; coddling the child is prohibited. 
This way a sense of fear is never introduced to the child and punishments only result 
naturally from wrong acts. The main objective of the first stage is, in essence, “to give 
children more real liberty and less power, to let them do more for themselves and demand 
less of others” (Rousseau, 1993, p.35). 
At stage II, the child is given a “negative education,” which, for Rousseau, meant 
for the least amount of parental intervention possible. Rousseau believed that allowing 
the  child  to  explore  his  external  world  unmediated  by constant  parental  interference 
would  most  benefit  the  child  at  this  developmental  stage. In  Rousseau’s  view,  early 
education allows the child to get to know their bodies and to learn to use their senses. The 
teacher can however shelter the child from societal institutions—at this point, “what must 
be done is to prevent anything from being done” (Rousseau, 1993, p. 41). In allowing 
Emile his freedom, the teacher helps him learn through his own experience. For example, 
the teacher should let the child get hurt so that he can become “acquainted” with his body 
(Rousseau, 1993, p.41). “Pain” Rousseau (1993) maintains, “is his first and most useful 
lesson” (p.41).  Rousseau postulates this kind of negative education in response to the 
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dominant model of education of his time, which emphasized rote learning and which, he 
believed, also taught children to reason prematurely.  The principle of reason being in 
intellectual fashion, the reigning educational maxim was Locke’s “reason with children” 
(Rousseau, 1993, p. 53). Addressing this trend, Rousseau (1993) remarks:
Those children who have been constantly reasoned with strike me as exceedingly 
silly. Of all man’s faculties, reason, which is, so to speak, compounded of all the 
rest, is the last and the choicest growth, and it is this you would use for the child’s  
early training. To make a man reasonable is the coping stone of good education, 
and yet you profess to train a child through his reason! You begin at the wrong 
end, you make the end the means. (p. 53) 
Rousseau  believed  that  the  child’s  capacities  develop  at  their  own  natural  rate  and 
interfering with the developmental process is part of what was wrong with the dominant 
educational paradigm of the Enlightenment.   
At age 12, Stage III  marks the beginning of “positive education,” or, in other 
words, that the educator is free to intervene in accordance with Rousseau’s guidance. At 
this point, the student, now twelve years of age, is developmentally ready to be concerned 
with intellectual and vocational education. He is ready to work according to the natural 
course of development for now, more than ever, his physical strength is greater than his 
needs (Rousseau, 1993, p.128). He is also ready for intellectual nourishment, for  he now 
capable of sustained attention. It is up to the tutor to determine what knowledge is true 
and what skills are useful to impart to the adolescent, while focusing on those subjects 
and tasks to which the child is most naturally attracted (Rousseau, 1993, p.130).   
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Stage IV is focused on learning social and moral lessons and rules of conduct. In 
introducing the child to society Rousseau acknowledges the conflict that arises from the 
fact that the natural child is individualistic and is not compelled to put the welfare of his 
fellow man before his  own. This is  what  Rousseau takes to be the basic  problem of 
citizenship:
Anyone  who  dares  to  institute  a  people  must  feel  capable  of,  so  to  speak, 
changing human nature;  of  transforming each individual  who by himself  is  a 
perfectly solitary whole into part  of a larger whole from which the individual 
would as it were received his life and his being. (1997, p. 69) 
It is not in one’s human nature to act as a citizen. Therefore, one can either have one’s 
nature  broken to  become a  citizen  or  one  can  salvage  their  good human nature,  but 
Rousseau had reservations  as  to  whether  one could be both a  good man and a good 
citizen. “Forced to combat nature or the social  institutions,  one must choose between 
making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time” (Rousseau, 1993, 
p. 39). Rousseau goes on to say that anyone that should try to be both in the current 
society will fail:
he who in civil order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature 
does  not  know what  he  wants.  Always  in  contradiction  with  himself,  always 
floating  between  inclinations  and  his  duties,  he  will  never  be  either  man  or 
citizen. (Rousseau, 1993, p.40) 
Yet while Rousseau believed that man should aspire to his natural state, he also 
acknowledged  that  man’s  rightful  place  was  now society  (Fisher,  p.128).  Therefore, 
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while  Rousseau  denigrated  society  for  having  unmade  the  goodness  of  man  and 
encourages an education that interferes as little as possible with the natural course of 
human development, he also acknowledges the inevitability of society. In light of this 
inevitability, education must ensure that the individual can function as a citizen. Though 
it would appear that Rousseau’s education is only interested in raising a man of nature 
and not a citizen, there is much evidence that Rousseau believed that those who were 
educated  as  he  delineates  in  Emile  could  find  a  balance.  For  example,  in  Book  V, 
Rousseau describes how Emile can become a good citizen and is given a copy of the 
Social  Contract.  In  fact,  Emile’s  education  is  meant  to  make  him  virtuous  and 
knowledgeable,  two  traits  which  are  required,  according  to  the  Social  Contract,  for 
intelligent  and  participatory  citizenship.  Therefore,  Rousseau  strikes  a  compromise 
between his desire to protect the naturally good human nature and his desire to ensure the 
morality of citizens.
For Rousseau, an individual could simply become a good man and a good citizen 
so long as he or she naturally develops as such. Rousseau (1993) begins Emile by asking, 
“how will a man live with others if he is educated for himself alone?” (p.9). Rousseau 
answers, “if the twofold aims could be resolved into one by removing the man’s self-
contradictions, one great obstacle to his happiness would be gone” (Rousseau, 1993, p.9). 
Rousseau’s pedagogical treatise is guided by his attempt to train this “exceptional man” 
that  can  be  both  naturally  good  and  morally  good.  In  doing  so,  Rousseau  lays  the 
necessary foundation for his social contract, as it is this naturally good and moral citizen 
that can actively participate in the society Rousseau envisions.  
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With two utopian works to his  name Rousseau can undoubtedly be canonized 
alongside Plato as a utopian philosopher of education.  Rousseau wanted to transform 
education and in doing so, he hoped to further the aims of his grand social agenda. In this  
way, Rousseau continues the utopian tradition put into motion by Plato centuries ago.
Plato and Rousseau
It is no coincidence that Plato and Rousseau, two marked names in educational 
philosophy,  also  happen  to  be  utopian  theorists.  In  reviewing  these  philosophies  of 
education, it becomes clear that there is a substantial connection between education and a 
desire for social reform. Plato and Rousseau found it impossible to separate educational 
theorizing from theorizing about an ideal state and vice versa. Historically, attempts at 
utopia  reflect  this  relation  as  does  the  fact  that  a  good theory  of  education  is  often 
characterized as one that reaches beyond the bounds of the present situation.
Although Plato and Rousseau both saw fit to wax utopian about their concerns for 
society and placed a great deal of emphasis on education for citizenship, the ideals that 
motivated their utopias diverged. For Plato, education is a communal activity wherein the 
citizen has a duty to fulfill the role which will contribute to a prosperous and just polis. 
Socialization and stratification are at the heart of Plato’s utopian philosophy of education. 
For Plato, average citizens were not fit to govern. Some were born with the potential to 
rule and others would never provide input on the social order of the polis. 
Rousseau,  on  the  other  hand,  is  patently  opposed  to  non-egalitarian  ideals. 
Equality  for  Rousseau  is  paramount  to  establishing  an  ideal  society,  a  principle  that 
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Plato’s  conception  of  justice  did  not  call  for.  Furthermore,  Emile is  the  educational 
journey  of  one  boy—the  individual  is  the  central  concern  for  Rousseau.  A  utopian 
education,  in  Rousseau’s  terms,  is  a  process  of  self-actualization,  and this  individual 
growth takes place in virtue of the absence of societal intervention. Plato and Rousseau 
advocated quite different views on the individual and society. 
The combination of the futuristic orientation, the assertion of ultimate values, and 
the  comprehensive  and detailed  design  are  the  key features  of  the  utopian  blueprint. 
While the structure of blueprints demands the evocation of universal values, it does not 
delimit which values can be decreed ideal, as is made plain by the distinction between 
Plato and Rousseau’s selected values. In Chapter 2, we’ll see how some conceive of this 
as a highly problematic element of blueprint utopianism. Until then, it must be noted that 
the requirement that values be unequivocally affirmed in the case of a blueprint is held by 
many  to  be  its  most  attractive  feature.  Darren  Webb  (2009),  makes  the  claim  that 
utopianism’s strength lies in its vision and that the contemporary “reluctance to offer 
‘closed’  and  ‘totalising’  blueprints...has  debilitating  consequences.  For  without 
substantive, normative representation, Utopia is unable to perform the functions ascribed 
to it” (p.744). Firm and unforgiving idealism is, after all, what most distinguishes utopian 
blueprints from ameliorative reform. The question then arises: can a theory be utopian 
without the component of idealism?
The  conceptual  and  methodological  influence  of  utopianism  on  education  is 
unmistakable.  The  very  notions  of  design,  reform,  and  social  change,  which  remain 
common interests in the field of education, are of utopian origin. However, the utopian 
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model of educational change has, for the most part, been abandoned for non ideal-driven, 
ameliorative  strategies.  Nevertheless,  imagining  utopia  remains  a  significant  element 
within the history of theorizing for educational change and though perhaps the belief in 
the  transformative  power  of  education  has  wavered,  it  has  not  been  completely 
extinguished from social consciousness.
Some blueprints  were  written to  be  taken quite  seriously and followed to the 
letter,  whereas others are interpreted as idealistic thought  experiments.  As the debate 
about where Plato and Rousseau’s intentions fit into this scheme rages on, so does the 
tradition  of  discussing  education  within  the  context  of  a  design  for  a  better  society. 
Education’s  interest  in  utopianism has  however  diminished  since  the  Enlightenment. 
Nonetheless, the utopian notion that education and social change are significantly linked 
as the respective means and the ends of the same equation is still strong. This suggests 
that until people give up on transforming society altogether, there will always be a shred 
of educational utopianism to hold onto.
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Chapter 2: Objections to Blueprint Utopianism and Iconoclastic 
Utopianism
Following  a  centuries  long  conceptual  partnership  between  utopian  and 
educational  thought,  utopianism  fell  into  disrepute  and  neither  the  disciplines  of 
education, literature nor political science would be caught fraternizing with it. Without 
the utopian spirit in education, the aim of radically transforming society has been traded 
in  for  the  more  modest  aim of  reform.  Several  cues  led  to  this  anti-utopian  turn  in 
education.  In this  chapter,  I  will  explain the twentieth century’s disenchantment  with 
utopianism. I  will  do this  by outlining strong objections raised against the traditional 
blueprint model of utopia which led to the decline of utopian theorizing tout court. These 
objections also double as, what Oliver Bennett (2001) has called “narratives of decline” 
or explanations for the (simultaneous) decline of optimism. 
 Though the anti-utopian fervor had been building since the First World War, 
more  substantial  opposition  to  blueprint  utopianism  took  shape  in  the  mid-1940’s, 
emphasized by the dawn of the Cold War. Specifically, three major objections converge 
to form the case against utopianism. Firstly, blueprint utopianism is viewed as a major 
political  risk  based  on  the  fear  that  utopian  blueprints  encourage  the  formation  of 
totalitarian states (Arendt, 1951; Berlin, 1997; Hayek, 1989; Popper, 1945). This view 
would come to be known as the liberal analysis of utopianism. Secondly, those concerned 
with educational policy and reform, most notably Tyack and Cuban (1996), emphasized 
the  practical  ineffectiveness  and  ultimate  infeasibility  of  utopian  blueprints.  Lastly, 
postmodernists  assert  that  traditional  utopian  principles  are  incompatible  with  the 
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egalitarian values of a pluralist society (Halpin, 2003; Levitas, 2010a; Sargisson, 1996).
While these arguments continue to problematize many thinkers’ utopian urges, 
there are some who remain compelled by elements of utopianism. In the latter portion of 
this  chapter,  I  will  relate  the  formulations  of  utopianism that  I  believe  address  and 
circumvent  many  of  the  practical  and  theoretical  obstacles  raised  in  the  first  half. 
Iconoclastic utopianism is the contemporary conception of utopianism that I invoke here 
to counter the belief that education is better off without the influence of utopian thinking 
and to re-instill a sense of optimism in the education community: teachers, researchers 
and theorists. Two theorists who have articulated versions of iconoclastic utopianism are 
David Halpin and Henry Giroux. Though Halpin and Giroux offer distinct approaches, 
both  recognize  the  necessity  of  utopian  thought  as  an  imaginative  precondition  for 
change. This acknowledgment fuels their desire to assert a utopian realism in our anti-
utopian age. 
Objections to Blueprint Utopianism8
The liberal analysis
From its  Platonic  inception,  the  intellectual  fashion  of  utopianism thrived  in 
education  to  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  at  which  point  the  enthusiasm  for 
utopianism  ebbed.  By  the  twentieth  century,  despite  repeated  attempts  to  undertake 
blueprints from theory to practise, a promised land had yet to be delivered. Instead of 
8
 It’s important to note that many critics of utopianism did not distinguish the types of utopianism (blueprint 
and iconoclastic), however, it is clear that the objections I list here target blueprints. 
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perfect societies, the utopian projects of the nineteenth century resulted in war and large-
scale human tragedy. The liberal analysis is a critique that holds utopianism responsible 
for  the  horrific  events  of  the  twentieth  century.  These  modern  anti-utopians  believe 
history to have rendered a verdict on utopianism. Between the fall of Soviet communism, 
for which many had great expectations, and the belief that totalitarianism directly resulted 
from utopian dreams, liberal anti-utopians have plenty of historical fodder for critique. 
“The fundamental charge”, as Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor (2009) put it, “was that 
all  utopian  thought  depends  on  an  exclusivist  and  authoritarian  political  outlook, 
antithetical to and destructive of the ‘open society’, a society marked out by liberty and 
tolerance” (p.94). To further summarise the liberal  analysis,  Leonard Schapiro,  in his 
1972 book  Totalitarianism, lists the weaknesses of a utopian person as follows: “he is 
preoccupied with ends and indifferent to means; he views man and society as a totality; 
he  makes  firm  and  dogmatic  assumptions;  he  is  preoccupied  with  management;  he 
neglects human variety” (p.85-90).
At the dawn of the Cold War, intellectuals lost their taste for any rationale that 
might justify or result in totalitarianism, for which blueprint utopianism had been indicted 
(Kumar, 1991; Levitas, 2010a; Olssen, 2006). Therefore, insofar as liberal anti-utopians 
wanted to advance a critique of totalitarianism, they denounced utopianism. The fear of 
totalitarian subservience resulted in the abandonment of socialist dreams in favor of a 
stringent  liberalism  that  would  protect  individual  freedom above  all  (Olssen,  2006). 
Utopian theorizing was essentially viewed as a danger to the Western values of liberalism 
and democracy, causing a lull in utopian research and an interruption in the progress of 
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utopian studies (Levitas, 2010a; Olssen, 2006; Sargisson, 1996; Halpin, 2003). To drive 
the  fear  home,  liberals  used  “utopianism”  as  a  catchall  term  for  totalitarianism, 
nationalism, Nazism and Marxism. This trend was kicked off by Richard Crossman, who, 
in the 1930s, “enlivened Oxford tutorials by inventing mutually congratulatory dialogues 
between Plato, Stalin and Hitler” (Goodwin & Taylor, 2009, p.94). 
Another liberal tactic used to strike fear into the heart of utopian sympathizers is 
the term ‘dystopian’, which was often used after the fall of the Soviet system to describe 
what  happens  to  a  society  when  utopian  efforts  go  awry.  As  Jacoby  (2005)  notes, 
“dystopia seeks to frighten by accentuating contemporary trends that threaten freedom” 
(p. 12-13). Conventional wisdom since the collapse of Soviet communism dictates that 
dystopia is the actual outcome of utopian efforts (Jacoby, p.13). This logic paints Hitler, 
Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot as utopians, and liberals such as Frederick Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, 
and Karl Popper have classified despots as utopian in order to further their cause. This 
stance gives credence to Jacoby’s (2005) aphorism, “to the desperate, utopian ideas seem 
meaningless; to the successful, they lack urgency or import; to the thinking classes, they  
lead to a murderous totalitarianism” (p.1, emphasis mine). In the following sections, I 
will elaborate on the liberal analyses of each of the three central above-mentioned critics, 
namely Hayek, Popper and Berlin.
Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992)
Austro-Hungarian born economist and political philosopher, Friedrick Hayek  is 
known widely as a defender of classical liberalism. His greatest contribution to the debate 
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on utopianism is made in his seminal work, The Road to Serfdom (1944). Therein, Hayek 
forcefully advocates against central planning, socialism, and utopianism. 
Hayek’s critique of utopianism is founded on the basis of its conflict with the 
principles of liberalism, mainly liberty and individualism. His criticism is further abided 
by his  strident  naturalism and  anti-rationalism.  In  The  Road  to  Serfdom (1944),  the 
problem Hayek identifies with utopianism is not with its particular ideals but the means 
he believed were required to attain them. In his speech entitled “On the pursuit of the 
ideal” delivered in 1988, Isaiah Berlin, echos Hayek’s sentiment, tracing the lineage of 
the twentieth century’s tyranny and oppression straight back to those ideals upon which 
utopianism is  founded. Utopian ideals,  Berlin  fervently argued,  can not  be arrived at 
through  moral  means,  as  they  necessitate  the  indoctrination  of  those  who  do  not 
intuitively share the ideal (1997).  
For  Hayek,  liberal  ideals  of  liberty  and  individualism  are  necessarily 
compromised in the pursuit of utopia. For Hayek, the natural order of things is a “self-
generating, ‘spontaneous order’” (Goodwin & Taylor, 2009, p.96). Free markets, in all 
their spontaneity and unpredictability, are free and natural (Hayek, 1944). The rational 
effort  of  central  planning  that  blueprint  utopianism  requires,  Hayek  argues,  is 
incompatible with his liberal ideals. It is incompatible in two ways: 1) because it involves 
an unnatural coercion of the naturally spontaneous order of things, opposing his ideal of 
liberty and 2) because it involves planning for others and therefore opposes his ideal of 
individualism. The coercive nature of design ultimately leads to totalitarianism; only in 
the absence of planning can freedom remain unadulterated. This was, above all, Hayek’s 
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motivating  principle,  as  he  sought  to  defend  individual  liberty  in  the  face  of  the 
infringement he believed to be inherent to blueprints. The role of the state, for Hayek 
(1944), was not to make such normative decisions on behalf of its people—in fact, only 
minimal interference from government is tolerable in his view. Furthermore, “society is 
viewed  as  a  growth  rather  than  an  artefact,  which  implies  that  pruning,  not  radical 
reconstruction, is the appropriate treatment” (Goodwin & Taylor, 2009, p.97). 
In  sum,  Hayek (1944)  famously argues  in  The Road to Serfdom that  a  “fatal 
conceit” lies at  the heart  of utopianism. Specifically,  “the belief  that through rational 
calculation and political will, society can be designed in ways that that will significantly 
improve the human conditions” is false (Olssen, p.100). It goes without saying that this 
view exemplifies the pessimistic nature of the anti-utopian trend. It is also a view that is 
shared by other critics of utopianism, including Karl Popper.
Karl Popper (1902-1994)
Popper objects to utopianism both on ideological and methodological grounds. 
First,  I’ll  describe  how  his  ideological  qualms  are  determined  by  his  fear  of 
totalitarianism, followed by his more unique methodological misgivings which have to do 
with his understanding of science. 
In  The Open Society  and Its  Enemies  (1945)  and  The Poverty  of  Historicism 
(1961)  Popper  argues  against  what  he  calls,  “utopian  engineering”.  Understanding 
utopian engineering to be “based on an a priori idea of rationality and a Platonic notion of 
ideal ends and means...he [Popper] condemns the utopian for playing God, reconstructing 
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society on the basis of human knowledge which is fallible” (Goodwin & Taylor, 2009, 
p.95). Utopian engineering, for Popper, means that before a situation can be improved we 
must first identify the end to which we should unequivocally commit ourselves. In The 
Poverty of Historicism, Popper warns that this holistic approach is dangerous and has 
historically  led  to  persecution.  Mark  Olssen  (2006)  summarises  Popper’s  view  of 
utopianism as such:
The  holist,  says  Popper,  believes  that  society  is  more  than  the  sum  of  the 
individuals who comprise it, which gives a license to those who wish to curtail the 
rights  and  freedoms  of  the  individual  in  the  name of  society’s  greater  good. 
(Olssen, p.104) 
In  The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), Popper charges Plato, Hegel and 
Marx with historicism, a main tenet of utopianism that contains the view that there are 
“inexorable laws of historical destiny” (p. v). Historicism, for Popper, is main tenet of 
utopianism,  which  he  believed resulted  in  totalitarianism.  In  Volume 1,  dedicated  to 
indicting Plato and his vision in the Republic Popper (1945) admonishes, “Even with the 
best intentions of making heaven on earth [utopianism] only succeeds in making it a hell
—that hell which man alone prepares for his fellow-men” (p.168).  Similar to Hayek, 
Popper problematizes the ideals of utopian blueprints due to the fact that they allow for 
behavior, just or unjust, to be rationalized in the name of the ideal. This rationalization is 
what led Plato, Popper (1945) argues, to justify a civic model built on deceit, eugenics 
and violence. The blank canvas the blueprint necessitates inevitably requires violence in 
order  to purge society of its  non-cooperative or simply unwanted members.9 Another 
9
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Popperian distaste for utopianism results from his belief that utopia can only be ruled by 
the Few, an authoritarian notion that his liberal sensibilities could not resolve. 
Popper  (1945)  also  argues  that  education  ought  to  make  the  individual 
autonomous,  able  to  make their  own choices  in  life,  rather  than  serve  to  manipulate 
individuals to act as the state would have them. Popper (1945) doesn’t think that society 
should rely on the greatness, wisdom and virtue of a few philosopher-king types. Instead, 
Popper argues in favor of an open society, which is to say a democratic state where the 
people can overthrow the government without violence.  
Popper’s methodological argument against blueprint utopianism is linked to his 
views on the nature of science. Goodwin and Taylor (2009) offer a summary of Popper’s 
position when they write, “the piecemeal, democratic method of change, operating by 
trial and error, is more scientific by Popper’s empiricist standard than the utopian method 
which, he claims, seeks to impose  in toto a rational, unchanging, aprioristic blueprint” 
(p.95). Blueprints, as Popper conceives of them arise in the mind of the thinker and are 
bluntly imposed on this  basis  alone—without  flexibility and without  experimentation. 
The major weakness of utopianism for Popper is really its mistaken epistemology, as it is 
based on unfalsifiable claims—falsifiability being his condition of empirical verification. 
Utopianism is epistemologically flimsy and therefore should not be the basis of any effort 
for social or political change. Popper would much prefer the method of Tyack and Cuban 
that I discuss in a later section, as it upholds the trial-and-error reform structure.
 Plato does suggest in the Republic that in order for his plan to be implemented all people over the age of 
ten would have to “disappear”.
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Isaiah Berlin (1909 - 1997)
Isaiah Berlin is known as the quintessential counter-Enlightenment liberal. This is 
because Berlin holds that the Enlightenment project of organizing society rationally in 
accordance with a universal ideal is incompatible with its belief in individual freedom, 
which is a core value of liberalism. Prioritizing his liberal convictions, Berlin denounces 
utopianism due to its monistic value structure and resultant potentially coercive social 
order.
 Utopians,  Berlin  (1980) attests,  are  “single-minded monists,  ruthless  fanatics, 
men possessed by an all-embracing coherent vision, who do not know the doubts and 
agonies of those who cannot wholly blind themselves to reality” (p. 173). The reasoning 
that brings one to think they can and should rearrange an entire social order is, according 
to  Berlin,  “born  of  a  naive  and  misplaced  confidence  in  human  rationality  and  a 
simplistic view of the world” (Garrard, 1997, p. 283). Subjecting people to a constrained 
way of being to suit the purposes of a utopian theory, even if well-intentioned, “always 
leads in the end to a terrible maiming of human beings, to political vivisection on an ever 
increasing scale” (Berlin, 1978 p. 193).
In  addition  to  rejecting  the  coercive  nature  of  utopianism,  Berlin  believed  it 
foolish and fundamentally mistaken to believe that the world could be tailored to human 
design. Berlin (1997) claims: 
The assumption that reality was a harmonious whole, a rational structure whose 
logical necessity is revealed to reason, a marvellously coherent system which a 
rational being cannot think or wish to be otherwise and still remain rational, and 
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in  which,  therefore,  it  must  feel  happy and fulfilled—all  this  is  an enormous 
fallacy. Nature is not a perfect machine, nor an exquisite organism, nor a rational 
system; it is a savage jungle ... life is a perpetual battle. (p.302)
Utopianism is both an irrational and immoral act for Berlin. Predicting the ends of man 
through reason is a conceited thing to do. In The Crooked Timber of Humanity, the title of 
which was meant to reflect the human inability to construct perfection with imperfect 
tools, Berlin (1997) discusses the romantically flawed will of the utopian: 
If  some  ends  recognised  as  fully  human  are  at  the  same  time  ultimate  and 
mutually  incompatible,  then  the  idea  of  a  golden  age,  a  perfect  society 
compounded of a synthesis of all the correct solutions to all the central problems 
of human life, is shown to be incoherent in principle. (p. 236-7)
For Berlin, the ultimate problem with the Enlightenment project is that it depends on a 
view  of  the  truth  as  singular  and  universal.  Furthermore,  Berlin  argued,  as  the 
postmodernists did, that the utopian belief in the rational compatibility of ends and the 
belief  in  progress  is  a  serious  threat  to  the  liberal  commitment  to  freedom,  i.e.  the 
freedom to  select  and pursue  one’s  own ideals.  There  are  others  who  echo  Berlin’s 
disdain for wholesale implementation of social order schemes. The educational reformists 
to whom I now turn count themselves among this group.
Educational Tinkering: Tyack and Cuban
Historically,  hopes  for  societal  change  have  often  been  channeled  through 
demands  for  educational  reform.  In  Tinkering  Toward  Utopia:  A  Century  of  Public  
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School  Reform, Tyack  and  Cuban  (1995)  argue  that  insofar  as  the  school  reform 
movement relies on blueprints for educational change it is misguided and irresponsible. 
With Millennium Goals and aspirations of the like repeatedly falling short, they aim their 
criticism at the utopian strategy they argue has as frequently failed to work. Tyack and 
Cuban (1995) point out several reasons to dispense with the blueprint strategy. First, they 
contend  that  the  hard  and  fast  visions  of  blueprints  have  made  unrealistic  promises, 
creating impossible expectations. Second, they highlight that blueprints require wholesale 
adoption, preventing the preservation of aspects of current systems that are, for all intents 
and  purposes,  working.  Third,  they  oppose  blueprints  in  virtue  of  their  top-down 
implementation route. 
Tyack and Cuban (1995) quote President Lyndon B. Johnson who, in the 1960’s, 
remarked,  “the  answer  to  all  our  national  problems  comes  down  to  a  single  word: 
education” (p. 2). The tradition of prescribing educational programs to mend the socio-
economic ailments of society is certainly a mechanism of utopian theorising. However, 
with reference to educational reform, utopian blueprints have made a myriad of promises 
that  have  never  seen  the  light  of  day.  This  has  caused  a  pessimism  toward  ideal 
educational change among education workers and policy makers. As Tyack and Cuban 
(1995) put it, “Policy talk about educational reform had been replete with extravagant 
claims  for  innovations  that  flickered  and  faded.  This  is  a  pie-in-the-sky  brand  of 
utopianism,  and  it  has  often  led  to  disillusionment  among  teachers  and  to  public 
cynicism” (p.10). Attempts at wholesale innovation of educational systems have led to 
the public suspicion of utopian educational reform, as reality has yet to match outlined 
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aspirations. 
In addition to not meeting educational ideals, Tyack and Cuban (1995) claim that 
overestimating the positive social change potential of education has repeatedly brought 
undue blame to institutions, teachers, and policy makers. They fear that the promise of an 
educational solution distracts the public eye from more serious political and economic 
issues:  “it’s  easier  to  provide  vocational  education  than  to  remedy  inequities  in 
employment and gross disparities in wealth and income (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p.4). 
Tyack and Cuban perceive the expectation of positive social change from educational 
practices to be a burden on those developing educational policy and on those working in 
the classroom. This expectation, which is derivative of utopianism in education, gives 
people undue hope. 
Tyack and Cuban also criticize utopian blueprints due to the fact that they are 
often  implemented  in  an  authoritarian  manner.  Tyack  and  Cuban  prefer  a  more 
egalitarian notion of reform, whereby members at all levels can participate in reform, 
over  the  top-down  implementation  of  blueprints.  Blueprints  traditionally  lack  well-
rounded input and feedback from the wide range of experts in the field. Furthermore, this 
method that neglects the voices of those encountering the very problems they seek to 
solve often offers irrelevant solutions. Blueprints, for Tyack and Cuban (1995), are often 
out of touch with local realities of schools.
Lastly,  in  noting  that  blueprints  require  comprehensive  adoption,  Tyack  and 
Cuban (1995) hold that  pre-existing valuable elements of society are discarded.  With 
trends in research coming and going so frequently, they insist that education could benefit 
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from a  resistance  to  change  and  to  cease  trying  to  satisfy the  public’s  every whim. 
Continuity,  compromise,  and  patience,  they  assert,  are  overlooked  virtues  of  the 
educational reformer (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). Indeed, time has often been retrospectively 
identified as the missing ingredient of failed reforms.
Tyack and Cuban delegitimize claims for utopian educational reform by charging 
the  strategy  with  ineffectiveness  and  impracticality.  Utopian  blueprints  have  made 
exaggerated claims about the scope and depth of their influence.  What society needs, 
according  to  Tyack  and  Cuban,  is  not  utopian  dreams  but  practical  and  realisable 
solutions to existing and imminent problems. Tinkering Toward Utopia is their attempt to 
argue that ameliorative, piecemeal reform is a more appropriate method of educational 
reform than implementing utopian blueprints. It is a more effective way of serving the 
educational community as it can target a single, local problem at a time. Furthermore, 
constant small changes can be considered part of a larger reform process; tinkering is an 
undertaking in what Raymond Williams (1961) has called “the long revolution”. Tyack 
and  Cuban  (1995)  note  that  while  philosophers  have  been  imagining  blueprints, 
practitioners and policy makers have been tinkering all along. As a subtle and frill-free 
method of troubleshooting, tinkering often falls beneath the radar of those keeping track 
of the reform process (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). Ultimately, they argue that it is time to 
make tinkering  the  central  focus  of  educational  experts  and leave  the  formulation  of 
blueprints to novelists.  
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Postmodernism or Anti-modernism? 
The implications of postmodernist criticism for utopianism are also widely cited 
in the literature (Halpin, 2003; Jacoby, 2007; Levitas, 2010a; Kumar, 1972; Goodwin & 
Taylor, 2009; Peters & Freeman-Moir, 2006). However, postmodernism is by no means a 
monolithic category,  and therefore I will  avoid making broad generalizations about it 
except to say postmodernism seeks to repudiate the Enlightenment project. In an effort to 
address only those doctrines of postmodernism that are relevant to the subject at hand, I 
will  appeal  to  three  individual  principles  that  are  representative  of  the  postmodern 
intellectual  movement.  The first  principle  is  the denial  of traditional  epistemology in 
favor of a constructivist epistemic paradigm, the second is the non-linear view of history, 
and the last is the view of cultural pessimism. The cultural logic contained in each of 
these postmodern principles marks a turn away from three cornerstones of utopianism 
(and modernism): universalism, progress and hope, respectively. I now will discuss each 
principle in turn.
Postmodernism  marks  the  move  from  the  acknowledgement  of  socially 
constructed knowledge to the claim that therefore all “knowledges” are relative (Butler, 
2002). Classical epistemology has long been guided by Enlightenment principles—this 
view contains a commitment to the conception of objectivity and Truth that began with 
Plato.  However,  with  increasing  exposure  to  non-western  cultural  traditions,  theories 
regarding the interaction between culture and the individual over time began to build. 
These theories hold realities to be subjective, propped up by conventions, language, and 
constant exposure. In essence, postmodernists argue that reality and our knowledge of it 
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is socially constructed.
 This epistemic stance is incompatible with the classical epistemology’s belief in 
objective reality and that universal truths can be uncovered. If there can be universal 
truths, then there can be universal values, a premise upon which blueprints are founded. 
There  is  no  better  example  than  that  of  Plato’s  theory  of  the  forms,  which  asserted 
precisely that there are universal truths and that access to them involves a birthright and 
an extensive education. The ethical conclusion of universalism is that there are values 
that  are  just  plain  right  for  everyone.  These  values  were  uncovered  through  an 
investigation of human nature. But as I have said, postmodernism argues that concepts 
like human nature are socially constructed and therefore does not believe we have access 
to absolute truth.
Epistemologically, postmodernism leads to relativism. The ethical conclusion of 
postmodernism is value pluralism. Pluralism holds that values can be incommensurable 
and incompatible, but also be equally valid. This view allows for directly opposing views 
to coexist on equal footing. Value Pluralism, in the words of one of its original advocates, 
Isaiah Berlin10, counters the notion that “all genuine questions must have one true answer 
and one only”  (1990, p.5). He further argues that “the notion of the perfect whole, the 
ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist, seems to be not merely unattainable—
that  is  a  truism—but  conceptually  incoherent”  (Berlin,  1990,  p.13).  It  is  incoherent 
because striving for a single ideal with the aim of a perfect society becomes impossible if 
10
 Isaiah Berlin is not a postmodernist as he did not subscribe to the definitive rejections of reason or 
progress. However, as a liberal and cosmopolitan, he renders one of the most well-articulated versions of 
pluralism out there and pluralism is a distinctly postmodern doctrine.
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one accepts the thesis of values pluralism. In this way, postmodernism does not allow for 
utopian idealism nor the collective striving for a singular ideal.
The postmodern turn in intellectual history weeded out the concept of Platonic 
universalism or Enlightenment idealism. The notion that there are normative ideals in 
existence that are universally desirable, applicable and true is epistemologically incorrect 
in the eyes these thinkers. As Halpin (2003) has put it, “Discourses about social aims and 
progress are generally frowned upon by postmodernists because they imply that universal 
or foundational truth are discoverable and applicable as guidelines for political action, 
something they deny is  either possible  or necessary” (p.3).  The rigidity of the ideals 
contained  in  some utopian  blueprints  entail  conflicts  with  the  postmodern  view  that 
values are not objective and universal but socially constructed and, as such, multiple and 
diverse.  Postmodernism  denies  the  possibility  of  absolute  truth  regarding  normative 
affairs and consequently also undermines the grand narratives that they underpin.
“Grand narratives,” “metanarratives” or “master narratives” (as they have been 
termed) are not all that different from blueprints. They are both historical accounts that 
presume that there is a logic behind the order and the way that life unfolds and that we 
can understand it. Popper used the term historicity to refer to what metanarratives do. His 
treatment  of  the  work  of  Plato,  Hegel  and  Marx  is  a  good  example  of  analysis  of 
metanarratives. 
In  The Postmodern Condition:  A report  on  knowledge,  Jean-Francois  Lyotard 
(1999) calls for the end of the formulation of metanarratives that offer comprehensive 
explanations  (or  sweeping  interpretations,  depending  on  your  perspective)  for  the 
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unraveling  of  history.  Postmodernists  defend  this  position  by  arguing  1)  that  the 
knowledge and experience of history did not progress in a logical or linear fashion and 2) 
no such totalizing truth exists and 3) even if it did, one could not possibly recount it from 
one’s  embedded  positionality.  2)  and  3)  can  be  inferred  from  the  postmodern 
epistemology I discussed above. 1), however, has major implications about the intuitive 
way history has traditionally been conceived. 
Unlike proponents of metanarratives, postmodernist theorists are not so eager to 
explain away chaos. Furthermore, postmodernists argue that metanarratives conceal more 
than they reveal. As Peters and Marshall (1996) explain, “modernity as the progress of a 
universal  reason  conceals  a  set  of  values  which  were/are  basically  Eurocentric, 
logocentric and homocentric under the guise of a universalism, an allegedly historical 
impartiality and neutrality” (p.159). The relations of power in which they exist determine 
the authoritative voice that offers metanarratives. In other words, there is no objective, 
impartial bird’s eye view of how the history of the world transpired. This is a significant 
turn away from the Enlightenment project, which believed that through reason such an 
account  could  and  should  be  deduced.  Lyotard  (1999)  believes  the  forsaking  of 
metanarratives to be the quintessentially postmodern act: 
Simplifying  to  the  extreme,  I  define  postmodern  as  incredulity  toward 
metanarratives.  This  incredulity  is  undoubtedly  a  product  of  progress  in  the 
sciences:  but  that  progress  in  turn presupposes  it.  To the obsolescence  of  the 
metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of 
metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied 
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on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, 
its  great  voyages,  its  great  goal.  It  is  being  dispersed  in  clouds  of  narrative 
language elements—narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and 
so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. 
Each  of  us  lives  at  the  intersection  of  many  of  these.  However,  we  do  not 
necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones 
we do establish are not necessarily communicable.” (p.xxiv)
To narrow in on the issue of progress, it becomes clear that postmodernists seek to erode 
the idea of a social progression of history that is championed by modernity. 
Modernity conceives of the trajectory of history as having a telos, namely that of 
progress.  Postmodernists  deny  history-as-progress  and  that  history  has  any  telos  or 
ultimate objective at all. For every historical advance, there has been a corresponding 
regression; the invention of the printing press, one of the greatest contributions to society 
amazingly allowed for  information  to  be  disseminated all  over  the  world and it  also 
facilitated the production and strengthened the impact of propaganda. 
A worldview based on the postmodern theory of history is one of stark acceptance 
and skepticism, “life has no ‘outside’ as such, happiness within it being gained by ‘saying 
yes  to  the  transience’  and  by  ‘making  a  friend  of  the  void’”  (Halpin,  2003,  p.3). 
Skepticism  is  the  only  viable  response  to  the  concepts  of  Truth  and  progress  that 
modernity held  certain.  Hope for  any kind of  specific  future  is  useless.  Some social 
theorists,  like  Merritt  Roe  Smith  and  Leo  Marx  (1994),  have  linked  the  pessimistic 
condition to the role of technology in producing postmodernity: 
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In  their  euphoric  embrace  of  that  faith,  the  utopian  thinkers  of  the 
Enlightenment invented a historical romance called Progress. In it they assigned a 
heroic role to the mechanic arts. That role, like the romance as a whole, rested on 
the old foundationalist faith in the capacity of the scientific rationalism to yield 
incontrovertible knowledge. But the part assigned to the mechanic arts in those 
early years, though heroic, actually was modest compared with what it became 
once it had been renamed "technology". By the 1920's "technology," no longer 
confined to its limited role as a mere practical means in the service of political  
ends, was becoming a flamboyant, overwhelming presence...in the aftermath of 
World War II, however, what had been a dissident minority's disenchantment with 
this overreaching hero spread to large segments of the population. As the visible 
effects of technology became more dubious, modernism lost its verve and people 
found the  romance less  and less  appealing.  After  the  Vietnam era,  the  ruling 
theme  of  Progress  came  to  seem  too  fantastic,  and  admirers  of  the  old 
Enlightenment  romance  now  were  drawn  to  a  new  kind  of  postmodern 
tragicomedy. (p.153) 
Another more pervasive account of cultural pessimism comes from Oliver Bennett. In his 
2001 book, Cultural Pessimism: Narratives of decline in the postmodern world, Bennett 
argues that cultural pessimism can be construed as arising from the postmodern turn:
 Cultural  pessimism arises  with  the  conviction  that  the  culture  of  a  nation,  a 
civilization or of humanity itself is in an irreversible process of decline. In its 
severest form, it goes beyond the idea of culture as a set of intellectual and artistic 
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practices, or even culture as a 'signifying system', and attaches itself to culture as 
a whole way of life...in the era of postmodernity, that is, the last few decades of 
the  twentieth  century,  narratives  of  decline  emerged  throughout  the  West  in 
widely  disparate  fields;  that  these  narratives  were  deeply  pessimistic  in  their 
implications; and that, taken together, they produced a representation of decline 
which could be seen as cultural in its broadest sense (p.1). 
This  pessimism constitutes  an  aversion  not  only  to  blueprints  but  to  all  theories  of 
utopianism  (although  it  applies  to  blueprints  most  severely).  As  I  described  above, 
imagining utopia involves a critique of one’s current reality and an implicit hope that it 
could be otherwise. Therefore, cultural pessimism precludes the potential for utopia to be 
envisioned. 
A Final Word on Criticisms
The objections to blueprint utopianism I have elaborated here are not exhaustive. 
For  example,  many  anti-utopians  have  other  concerns  in  addition  to  their  principal 
objections. Hayek is most worried about totalitarianism, but he also doubts the feasibility 
of utopia and rejects universalism as well. Common threads can thus be found in all three 
critical stances. As I have suggested above, a significant effect of these counter-utopian 
arguments has been the development of a grim worldview that is justified by the dubious 
attainability and questionable ideological backing of utopian ideals. 
The liberals,  reformists  and postmodernists  all  make warranted claims against 
utopianism.  However,  the  critique  is  narrow as  it  fails  to  acknowledge  all  forms  of 
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utopianism—it  has  focused  most  of  its  energy  on  blueprint  utopianism.  This  is  not 
surprising; blueprint utopianism has been rhetorically successful due to its elaborate and 
detailed  promises  about  a  future  people  can  hope  for.  Yet  although  blueprints  do 
historically constitute a substantial part of utopian theory, they do not make up the whole; 
there are also non-blueprint utopian theories. In the late twentieth century and the twenty-
first  century,  non-blueprint  utopias  are  increasingly  being  formulated  to  assuage 
criticisms discussed above without relinquishing utopian hope altogether. One promising 
alternative to the blueprint that has surfaced or, more aptly, resurfaced is ‘iconoclastic 
utopianism’. I will now turn to an exploration of this form of utopianism as it is discussed 
in the work of Russell Jacoby (1999; 2007). 
Iconoclastic Utopianism
At present, utopianism in education has been heavily damaged by the arguments 
outlined  above.  However,  in  ceasing  to  entertain  the  notion  of  utopia,  the  baby was 
thrown out with the bathwater. Fortunately, the core merits of utopianism, idealism and 
hope  for  social  change,  have  not  been  completely  eradicated.  In  the  streets,  civil 
movements  of  resistance,  such  as  the  2012  Québec  student  movement  and  the 
international  Occupy  movements,  which  began  in  the  fall  of  2011,  are  both  protest 
movements fighting back against the notion that there is no alternative to the present 
social order. Similarly,  in the academy, a faction of social scientists and philosophers 
who  sympathize  with  the  above  objections  but  are  nonetheless  frustrated  with  the 
prevailing orthodoxy of cynicism, are determined to rethink the potential for utopianism. 
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Utopian Studies is thus a fresh and growing field that is invigorated by new ways of 
thinking about old ideas.
In  Picture  Imperfect, Russell  Jacoby  (2007)  discussed  an  alternative  way  of 
envisioning  utopia.  Iconoclastic  utopianism  marks  a  move  away  from  many  of  the 
traditional elements found in blueprints. This move away consists primarily in the fact 
that iconoclastic utopias do not admit of a detailed vision of the future. Jacoby (2007) 
comments, “in outfitting utopia, they [blueprinters] order from the catalogue of their day. 
With their  schedules and seating arrangements, their  utopias stand condemned not by 
their capaciousness but by their narrowness, not by their extravagance but their poverty. 
History soon eclipses  them” (p.32).  Iconoclastic  utopians  are  weary of  the  seductive 
promises made by the blueprint tradition. Supporters of the iconoclastic utopian approach 
have, throughout history, “fashioned a utopianism committed to the future but reserved 
about  it.  Against  the  dominant  tradition  of  blueprints,  they  offered  an  imageless 
utopianism laced with passion and spirit” (Jacoby, 2007, p.33). Iconoclasts envision the 
conditions for utopia but refrain from depicting utopia itself. For example, in thinking 
more broadly of  justice rather  than specifically of socialism,  iconoclasts  cut  back on 
having to contest recipe after recipe for a perfect society. Spurning the trial and error 
method  of  establishing  a  utopia  is  a  defense  mechanism,  that  allows  for  the 
disappointment of a failure to be avoided. Iconoclasts believe it is important to protect 
society from the fallout, as each regrettable blueprint costs the collective consciousness 
of society more in hope and resiliency (Jacoby, 2007, p.34). 
Iconoclastic  utopianism  dates  back  to  the  Medieval  period,  to  Maimonides, 
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however its lack of solid consequential features earned it scant attention, Jacoby (2007) 
explains.  He  remarks  that  iconoclasm  was  quite  common  among  many  European, 
twentieth-century  Jewish  scholars  such  as  Theodore  W.  Adorno,  Walter  Benjamin, 
Herbert Marcuse and Ernst Bloch, the most iconoclastic text being Ernst Bloch’s  The 
Spirit  of  Utopia (2000). These scholars “resisted representing the future” and resisted 
visualizing perfection (Jacoby,  2007, p.  xvii).  This tendency is  historically predicated 
upon the Maimonidian tradition of abstaining from formulating positive descriptions of 
God. To engage in positive or affirmative characterization of God is to impose a limit on 
the very concept. To refrain from this transgression, Jacoby explains that Maimonides 
encouraged the formulation of only negative attributions to God, “for whatever we utter 
with the intention of extolling or praising Him, contains something that cannot be applied 
to God, and includes derogatory expressions; it is therefore more becoming to be silent, 
and to be content with intellectual reflection” (Maimonides, 1956, p.85). 
Iconoclasts are the descendants of this logic. Just as Jewish thinkers would not 
define God, Jacoby argues, the iconoclastic utopians refuse to concretely visualize utopia 
for fear of restricting it and as a way of giving it its due deference. “Like the resistance to 
naming God,” Jacoby (2007) reflects, “the reluctance to depict utopia does not diminish 
but exalts it. It bespeaks the gap between now and then. It refuses to reduce the unknown 
future to the well-known present, the hope to its cause” (p. 36). 
Iconoclastic utopia may not be a means to inspiring revolution but it can easily 
encourages a belief in one’s ability to overcome present odds. The iconoclastic strategy 
speaks to pessimism and its political conclusion, apathy, by creating a horizon of hope to 
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ponder.  The strategy relies upon the idea that  by thinking critically about  one’s own 
world and about utopia, one can begin to think a better world is possible. Iconoclasts are 
meant  to  be  equal  parts  realist  and  idealist—moderate  utopians,  but  fervent  critics. 
Iconoclasts, after all, were “utopians against the current. They did not surrender to the 
drumbeat  of  everyday  emergencies (as  reformers  do).  Nor  did  they  paint  utopia  in 
glowing colors (as blueprint utopians do) (Jacoby, 2007, p.xviii)”. Although iconoclastic 
utopians did not let their idealism get the best of them, they were nonetheless committed 
to  “a very different  future  of  harmony and happiness”  (Jacoby,  2007,  p.85).  Indeed, 
iconoclastic  utopians  are  not  totally  estranged  from  futural  thought,  but  they  are 
restrained by custom to temper their idealism for fear of spoiling what dreams may come. 
As Jacoby (2007) explains:
While Jewish history is replete with reformers, revolutionaries and visionaries, it 
includes  almost  no  equivalent  to  Thomas  More,  Charles  Fourier,  or  Edward 
Bellamy, who demarcated the exact dimensions of utopia. Rather, it gave rise to 
iconoclastic utopians drenched in romantic and mystical longing for the future. 
(p.85)
In  light  of  the  criticisms  I  outlined  above,  it  seems  clear  why many might  interpret 
iconoclastic utopianism to be a more friendly strategy for change than the blueprint. 
Some educational theorists have gone the iconoclastic route, without necessarily 
being  aware  of  the  framework’s  history.  Henry  Giroux  and  David  Halpin  are  two 
educationally-oriented  thinkers  who  have  adopted  the  iconoclastic  framework  to 
articulate  their  conceptions  of  utopianism.  Their  contemporary  articulations  of 
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iconoclastic utopianism involve asserting an approach that discards features of blueprint 
utopianism. New utopian iconoclasts  prefer  to rely on a convergence of principles to 
incite change namely, critical thinking, hope, attention to socio-historical circumstances, 
and collectivity. David Halpin’s theory of utopian realism and Henry Giroux’s theory of 
educated hope both exemplify this new iconoclastic approach to utopianism. 
David Halpin: Utopian Realism 
David Halpin has been fixated on rehabilitating utopian thinking for education for 
more than ten years. In 1999, Halpin began his quest by affirming that a world without 
utopias “would be a world without social hope, a world of resignation to the status quo” 
(p. 435). Halpin has dedicated much of his career to articulating a viable and relevant 
utopian theory for educational policy. 
In his book  Hope and education: The role of the utopian imagination,  Halpin 
(2003) structures his model of utopian realism to pacify detractors and satisfy utopian 
hopefuls. Halpin does this by constructing a theory of utopianism that calls for a more 
modest revolution than that of utopias past. Utopian realism constructs “a possible future 
for education that takes into consideration actually existing trends in the modern world’ 
(Halpin, 1999, p. 358). Utopian realism is the shell of an action plan, the intention of 
which  is  for  utopian  realism  to  offer  “integrated  solutions  to  problems  instead  of 
unilateral ones” (2003, p.7). The method Halpin puts forward attempts to identify “the 
forces and resources within the present social order that are capable of transforming it for 
the better, so as to provide a significant dynamic for action in the here and now” (Halpin, 
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2003, p.59). This, Halpin believes, will allow for peoples’ hopes to translate into action 
plans. Putting this utopian imagination to work with these guidelines can jumpstart the 
kind of change Halpin would like to see. Utopian realists, at bottom, aim:
 to  identify  and  describe  a  vision  for  the  future  that  is  based  upon  an 
understanding of the forces and resources within the present order that are capable 
of  transforming  it  for  the  better  in  the  future,  so  as  to  provide  a  significant 
dynamic for action in the here and now. (Halpin, 2003c)
Utopian realism is  a way of transforming hopeful  thoughts for the future into 
action plans for change (Halpin, 2003, p.60). With these plans and an optimistic frame of 
mind, an individual can become realistically hopeful about the future by “placing sensible 
limits on the imaginings of utopians through encouraging a form of practical rather than 
naïve  optimism”  (Halpin,  2003,  p.60).  For  Halpin,  utopian  realism  is  about  the 
“responsible exercise of hope in the present” (Halpin, 2003, p.60).  
Utopian  realism  also  aims  to  overcome  ‘either-or’  politics  in  education;  in 
politics,  this  strategy is  often referred to as “third way”.  Utopian realism,  for Halpin 
(2003), is meant to bridge the gap between traditional utopian idealism on one end and 
postmodern  scepticism  on  the  other.  Ultimately,  the  aim  is  to  bring  hope  back  to 
educational deliberations. This conception is reflective of Halpin’s iconoclastic penchant, 
as its aim is to facilitate hopeful imagining—the precondition for change--rather than to 
specify how the change needs to happen or what the future will look like. By formulating 
his utopian theory this way, Halpin dodges the criticism aimed at blueprints.
Halpin  further  evades  the  scorn  of  critics  by  not  making  all-encompassing 
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prescriptions. He is uneasy with the practice of authoritatively imposing a one-size-fits-
all vision. For this reason, Halpin (2003) concedes, “ ...postmodern scepticisms are not 
only proper, but imperative, especially in those circumstances today in which people are 
the victims of particular forms of totalizing discourse—crude nationalism arguably being 
the most potent example at the moment” (p.4). Halpin articulates a theory of utopia that 
requires a level of specificity and input from the community that stands to change. This, 
Halpin (2007) maintains, sets utopian realism apart from unrealistic blueprints. 
In keeping with the iconoclastic tradition, Halpin emphasizes reforming the actual 
contexts rather than wiping socio-historical slates clean. Halpin designed utopian realism 
to be appreciative of observable socio-historical trends. This kind of attention to relevant, 
local phenomena is what Tyack and Cuban believed to be missing from utopian thought. 
Nonetheless,  he  continues,  “meaningful  political  action,  both  generally  and  in  the 
education context in particular, cannot surely proceed without some embedded sense of 
of value” (p.4). Halpin, after all, believes that hopeful and realistic imagining contributes 
to hopeful and realistic action, bridging the gap between idealism and realism. Halpin 
affirms the role idealism has to play in practical action. 
Halpin (2003) also defends a measure of utopian idealism based on the fact that 
its  absence  would  do  us  more  harm  than  good:  “postmodernism’s  mockery  at  the 
possibility of social progress along such lines, and its scornful dismissal of the idea that  
specific standards of validity are worth searching for is likely to be self-fulfilling if we 
are  not  careful”  (p.5).  Halpin,  therefore,  does  hold  onto  some  of  the  Enlightenment 
conception of utopianism—namely, the belief in social progress. 
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 By thinking  about  utopianism as  a  strategy for  change  as  Halpin  does,  one 
quickly realizes one of its central benefits is that, unlike many postmodern discourses, it 
does not merely offer critique. Instead, Halpin’s utopianism also offers solutions in the 
form of hopes.  These aspirations,  insofar  as  individuals  think them through,  serve to 
counteract  pessimism  and  apathy.  The  belief  in  an  improved  future  and  the  open 
anticipation  of  it  triggers  the  optimistic  conviction  that  present  life  can  be  improved 
(Halpin, 2003c). Criticism alone does not have this effect on people. Utopian thinking, à 
la Halpin, is the first step toward an individual commitment to change. In this way, the 
utopian method constitutes a personal transformation, a way of relieving one’s self from a 
debilitating sense of resignation. For Halpin, this relief is especially important for those 
in  and  around  the  educational  community  because  active  participation  and  hope  are 
necessary if real change is to occur.
Like all utopians, Halpin is concerned for the future of education, but he is not 
willing to sacrifice the present for it. Halpin accepts the educational reality and seeks to 
improve it. However, he is not fixated on a particular vision of what the future may look 
like or on how many steps it will take to get to a perfect educational system. Rather, he is  
concerned with catalyzing real and relatable efforts for change that he argues begin in the 
“radical utopian imagination” (2007, p.244).
Henry Giroux: Educated Hope
Henry Giroux  works  primarily  in  the  field  of  utopian  pedagogy,  a  field  that 
emerged in response to the perceived failings of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy is 
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sympathetic to anti-utopian principles of disenchantment and despair, which, for Giroux, 
get in the way of positive engagement with education. Utopian pedagogy goes beyond 
critique,  deconstruction,  and placing  blame—it  supplies  its  devotees  with  a  powerful 
sense  of  agency  for  them  to  enact  the  change  they  hope  for.  Giroux’s  utopianism 
embodies and furthers the mission of utopian pedagogy and he remains one of the field’s 
most renowned contributors.
Following the thought of Pierre Bourdieu, Giroux (2003) calls upon the notion of 
‘realist utopias’ as a conceptual tool for connecting “theory, critique, education and the 
discourse of possibility” (Giroux, 2006; 2007).  For Giroux, utopianism is  an ongoing 
process with no particular destination or point at which striving for the aims of justice 
will end. Giroux also refuses to identify ends or ideals worth striving for in order to avoid 
encouraging a homogeneous vision of the future. 
Giroux’s  utopianism  signifies  his  commitment  to  experimenting  with  utopian 
variables in education,  with the hope that new and interesting ways of conceiving of 
alternatives  to  the  present  neoliberal  social  order  will  emerge.  In  essence,  Giroux’s 
utopianism  is  directly  concerned  with  exploring  the  relationship  between  critical 
citizenship and education (Giroux, 2003), the hope being that the latter can and should 
facilitate the former.
In order to demonstrate his dissatisfaction with these prevailing pessimistic times, 
Giroux (2007) concedes “it has become easier to imagine the end of the world than the 
end of capitalism” (p.25). According to Giroux, we are settled in dystopia because our 
social condition is so “impoverished” that we cannot enact an alternative to it, even in the 
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face of widespread oppression (2007, p.32). By “impoverished”, Giroux is referring to is 
our intellectual/human resources. Giroux (2007) observes that so many “refuse to address 
human suffering and social justice” or if they do, they adopt the increasingly common 
view that fundamental improvement is only possible from the inside of capitalism.  From 
the perspective of a cog in the neoliberal machine, social improvement is dependent on 
market forces.  The adoption of this  point of view by those who Giroux deems to be 
society’s guardians prevents their ability to offer social critique and consequently, poses a 
great threat to utopianism. This route to social improvement “undermines the need to 
reclaim utopian thinking both as a discourse of human rights and as a moral referent for 
the project of dismantling and transforming dominant structures of wealth and power” 
(2007, p.32).   
In addition to offering the above critique of the current social order, Giroux also 
elaborates a theory of ‘educated hope’ to combat anti-utopianism and the apathy brought 
on by the seemingly insurmountable status quo. Educated hope is laid out for the first 
time  in  his  article,  “Utopian  Thinking  Under  the  Sign  of  Neoliberalism:  Towards  a 
Critical Pedagogy of Educated Hope”. Here, Giroux (2003) describes educated hope as a:
precondition for individual and social struggle,  the ongoing practice of critical 
education in a wide variety of sites, and a mark of courage on the part of the 
intellectuals in and out of the academy who use the resources of theory to address 
pressing social problems. (p.98)
 Giroux goes on to characterize his version of hope as: 
a referent for civic courage and its ability to mediate the memory of loss and the 
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experience of injustice as part of a broader attempt to open up new locations of 
struggle, contest the workings of oppressive power and undermine various forms 
of domination” (p.98). 
Hope, for Giroux, is  the longing for that  results  from the intuition that “something’s 
missing”  (2001).  Giroux’s  aim  is  to  direct  this  naturally  occurring,  underdeveloped 
longing into educated hope (2003). Educated hope is, at its core, about keeping critical 
thought alive and open to a future of radical possibility. Educated hope involves speaking 
the language of possibility: the possibility of counter-hegemonic uprisings, the possibility 
of equality,  the possibility of free education.  Voicing these possibilities can open the 
window for their actual manifestation (Peters & Freeman-Moir, 2006). 
For Giroux, educated hope is a concrete utopian endeavor as it serves to empower 
the agency of those who personify it, “fashioning those human capacities in which people 
might recognize the potential  they have as political  agents capable of imagining new 
democratic forms of human association in the world and carrying out initiatives necessary 
to construct them” (Giroux, 2001, p. 235). Educated hope arms citizens with a toolbelt of 
radical skills enabling them to:
 create citizens who understand the relationship between power and knowledge, 
are  capable  of  questioning  the  basic  assumptions  that  govern  political  life, 
recognise  the  limitations  of  contemporary  institutions,  possess  the  courage 
required to take risks and challenge power, and are equipped with the skills and 
confidence  needed to  transform existing  social  and political  institutions  rather 
than simply adapt to them. (Webb, 2009, p.752)
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On a collective level, educated hope and critical citizenship education share a common 
dream of equipping citizens with the ability, the desire and the confidence to envision 
their utopian dreams.  
Blueprints and Iconoclastic Utopianism 
Until the liberal and postmodern stifling of idealism, the utopian conversation in 
the philosophy of education was lively. Philosophers had high hopes and robust ideals — 
Plato followed the Good and Rousseau was devoted to Nature. Philosophers of education 
constructed  their  systems  as  maps  leading  to  their  vision  of  the  Good  Life.  The 
iconoclastic tradition of utopian thought, however, reveals another strategy for stirring up 
the optimism necessary to bring about social change. 
Halpin’s utopian discourse addresses the field of educational policy and Giroux’s 
discourse is squarely in the realm of radical or utopian pedagogy, but nonetheless, it can 
be said that  there are points at  which their  views converge and points at  which they 
diverge. Halpin’s utopian realism accepts the state of educational policy and seeks new 
and creative ways to improve it. Giroux’s utopian pedagogy, on the other hand, expresses 
a much more militant opposition to the status quo; it “mounts an explicit challenge to 
neoliberal hegemony and draws on utopianism as a direct form of oppositional practice” 
(Webb, 2009, p.750). Furthermore, Halpin’s utopian realism has a stipulated definition of 
utopia, whereas Giroux’s utopian pedagogy employs a concept of utopia that does not 
admit of a strict or delimiting definition. Instead, the aim of utopian pedagogy is to keep 
the very foundational concept of utopia open to growth, input and alteration.  
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Unlike the extravagant blueprints Plato and Rousseau conceived of, Halpin and 
Giroux usher  in  a comparatively sensible alternative utopianism. As iconoclasts,  they 
makes fewer promises and set  up less of a chance for disappointment.  Therefore,  the 
failure of either of these theories less likely to produce more justification for the anti-
utopian. On the other hand, perhaps playing it safe also means that these iconoclastic 
formulations dull the sword of utopianism by removing arguably its sharpest aspect: its 
concrete  vision.  With  such an  outstanding reservation  on the  table,  the  debate  about 
utopianism for education has not yet reached its conclusion.
The belief that contemporary efforts for social change lack energy and optimism 
is certainly a good reason to revisit utopian theories. However, the question of which 
types  of  utopianism are worth pursuing in  today’s  world still  lacks  consensus  in  the 
educational community. Blueprints were once in vogue. As of late, iconoclastic utopias 
have become the fashion. This trend has emerged as a result of the need to revive the 
hopefulness utopianism can offer and because iconoclastic utopian theories step on far 
fewer toes than the blueprints do. Ultimately,  the debate comes down to two utopian 
strategies: 1) the firm affirmation of universal ideal(s), planning, and a concrete vision of 
the future and 2) a more laissez-faire approach that attempts to converge critical thinking, 
hope,  attention  to  socio-historical  circumstances,  and  collective  efforts.  Iconoclastic 
utopianism raises the question of whether we need to posit universal ideals in order to 
improve education in practical terms. Or perhaps we can transform society for the better 
with only a critical gaze, an optimistic attitude, and comrades-in-arms. Gramsci (1978) 
captures  the  latter  sentiment  in  his  famous  dictum,  “pessimism  of  the  intellect  and 
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optimism of the will” (p.9). In the following chapter, I explore the extent of iconoclastic 
utopianism’s practical reach. In addition, I will offer considerations for a new direction 
for utopian thinking in education.
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Chapter 3: Iconoclastic utopianism and beyond
As I have shown, when blueprint utopianism fell from grace it was met with a 
barrage  of  criticism.  Critics  condemned  blueprints  as  totalitarian,  unrealistic,  and 
universalist.  One  response  to  these  condemnations  has  been  to  revisit  iconoclastic 
utopianism,  a  more  moderate  and  flexible  utopianism that  circumvents  much  of  the 
criticism that  I  laid  out  in  Chapter  2.  As I  noted,  Halpin  and Giroux both  articulate 
contemporary theories of iconoclastic utopianism. In doing so, they do not offer rigid 
formulas for a perfect world, nor do they attempt to define perfection or identify concrete 
ideals. Instead, their theories are fortified by the principles of critical thinking, a hopeful 
orientation  toward  the  future,  an  appreciation  of  present  day  circumstances,  and 
collectivity. Their aim is to inspire and enable educational practices for social change by 
creating  the  preconditions  for  social  change  rather  than  mapping  out  the  changes 
themselves.
In  this  final  chapter,  I  will  begin  by exploring  an  educational  application  for 
iconoclastic  utopianism  namely,  how  iconoclastic  utopianism  can  supplement 
transformative learning and its objectives. In doing so, I will refer to the work of adult 
educator, Budd L. Hall. 
Following this analysis of the educational implications of iconoclastic utopianism, 
I will underscore some of its practical and theoretical limitations. The shortcomings of 
contemporary iconoclastic utopianism, I indicate, derive from its aversion to affirming 
universal ideals. While Halpin and Giroux have been quite busy satisfying the strictures 
put in place by the critics of utopianism—a noble effort—I argue that they have excluded 
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utopianism’s most active ingredient: universalism. Iconoclastic utopianism does indeed 
serve a purpose; in fact, it can serve the purposes of adult educators and civic educators 
quite  well.  However,  I  question  the  ability  of  iconoclastic  utopianism to  deliver  the 
change utopianism is meant to bring about. Iconoclastic utopianism, I argue, is not an 
acceptable substitute for blueprint utopianism.
Lastly, I will briefly outline some considerations for new directions for utopian 
philosophies  of  education.  I  claim that  it  is  possible  and worthwhile  to  conserve the 
transformative and assertive power universalism brings to utopianism alongside the more 
open-ended iconoclastic  utopianism. This  kind of  reconciliatory approach mirrors  the 
kind of theory currently being offered in the field of ethics and development by Martha 
Nussbaum (1999; 2003; 2009; 2011). Nussbaum advocates a theory for development that 
is founded on a set of universal principles which also permits of additions and further 
exploration. Using utopianism to promise a perfect world may have been a fool’s dream, 
but  using  utopianism to  ensure  a  minimal  level  of  well-being  for  all,  as  Nussbaum 
proposes, may not be. In this chapter, I hope to begin a conversation about a two-tiered 
theory of utopianism for social change. This theory consists of a foundation of universal 
principles and, once established, an iconoclastic phase of exploring and experimenting 
with more localized strategies can be engaged in. I’ll discuss how and why this two-tiered 
utopianism is a theory worthy of future study for scholars of education concerned with 
social change.                        
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Implementing Iconoclastic Utopianism   
Bud Hall: Iconoclastic Utopianism for Adult Education
    The first way that iconoclastic utopianism can be of practical consequence to 
education  is  articulated  by,  Canadian  adult  educator,  Budd  L.  Hall.  Hall  (2009)  is 
motivated by the problem of pessimism and the feeling of powerlessness in the face of 
the  globalization  in  his  article  “The  Right  to  a  new  utopia:  Adult  learning  and  the 
changing world of work in an era of global Capitalism”. Therein, Hall makes the case for 
New  Utopian  visions,  which  take  up  an  iconoclastic  strategy.  Hall  posits  that 
transformative learning practices can facilitate the development of this new vision and, in 
turn, be guided by it.
While scholars have been busy arguing against standard versions of utopianism, 
Hall declares that globalization has created another utopian vision, one that has come to 
dominate the Western consciousness. Popularly caricatured as the “McWorld” vision, this 
view is at bottom a global market utopia. Describing this view, Hall (2009) remarks that:
Globalization is a utopian vision. The creation of an integrated twenty-four hours 
per day economic system that allows total freedom for investors to ﬁnd cheap 
money to borrow and high returns on investment anywhere in the world—is a 
dream. That all limits on corporate and individual proﬁts would be removed—is a 
dream. That all workers in all countries would be integrated into global networks 
of production. That responsibilities to shareholders could take precedence over 
health and safety and environmental concerns—is a dream. (p.97)
Corporate  multinationals  and  political  leaders,  he  argues,  are  promoting  this  utopian 
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vision as the only pathway to a better world (Hall, 2009, p.98). This promise is a vaunted 
answer to the dreams of both the rich and the poor, acting as an insurance policy for the 
rich and a lottery ticket for the poor. As a result of this clever marketing effort, this vision 
of utopia is increasingly becoming a reality. 
This global market utopia has received a spectrum of responses from the field of 
adult  education and training.  Some have embraced the “McWorld” mission and what 
hope it  can provide.  Others are making the best of what seems to be an unassailable 
viewpoint. Hall comments that this despondent response from both adult educators and 
from the general public is particularly reflective of what Linda McGuaig (1999) calls “the 
cult of impotence”. “Canadians”, McQuaig (1999) argues, “have been sold a myth of 
powerlessness because it serves the interest of the current ruling alliances—not because, 
in fact, we do not have any power as citizens” (p.283). This feeling of powerlessness 
leads to a paralyzing pessimism, which in turn, guards the “McWorld” cultural paradigm. 
 Fortunately, there are others who are more resistant and are looking for ways to 
counteract the global market utopian vision. Hall, who belongs to this latter category, 
notes  that  policy  is  written  by subscribers  of  each  of  these  three  positions  and  that 
therefore a strong line of defence is difficult to muster. Nonetheless, there are education 
associations that have amended their mission statements to include an anti-globalization 
campaign. For example, Hall (2009) notes:
The International Council for Adult Education (ICAE), a global network of some 
700 local and national NGOs interested in adult learning, organized a sixth World 
Assembly of Adult  Education in Jamaica in 2001, calling for global advocacy 
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towards adult learning for individual and collective transformation in the age of 
globalization. (p.106-107)
Hall  contends that  the  scholars  in  the  field  of  adult  education and other  like-minded 
members of society can and ought to facilitate new directions for utopian thinking. Hall 
(2009) wants to rally the troops and so he announces, “it is time for the resources and 
capabilities  of  the  adult  learning communities  to  support  the  search  for  new utopian 
visions” (p.107).
With  this  responsibility  in  mind,  Hall  turns  to  a  means  for  change  that  is 
congruent with the iconoclastic strategy I have described. Placing a similar emphasis on 
critical thinking, hope,  attention to specificity and collective imagining as Halpin and 
Giroux  do,  Hall’s  strategy fits  into  the  iconoclastic  mould.  He  makes  no  attempt  at 
defining a perfect world or ascribing universal ideals and places most of the emphasis on 
critical thinking and collective deliberation.
The centrally iconoclastic feature of Hall’s strategy for a new utopia is that he 
believes that change begins in the mind of the individual. Hall (2009) declares that, “the 
most powerful instruments for transforming the world that we have are our own minds” 
(p.107). This insistence works to inciting a powerful sense of agency in the individual. 
Combined with creative thought and collective deliberation,  the seeds of a new, anti-
capitalist  utopia,  Hall  believes,  can  be  sown.  One  specific  way adult  education  and 
training  facilitate  this  kind  of  utopian  thinking  is  by  supporting  “the  release  of  our 
creativity and imagination” (p.108). Hall (2006) also calls for adult educators to engage 
in creative inquiries themselves for the purpose of furthering new directions for utopia. 
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Hall (2006) has identified one such inquiry to be that of interdisciplinary investigation of 
social movement learning; he urges:
a  more  systematic  investigation  into  the  learning and knowledge strategies  of 
social movements is also an important potential contribution to the scholarship of 
social movements themselves. It is time that the artificial boundaries that separate 
learning, educational, and knowledge theorists from the social movement theorists 
in  sociology,  history,  political  science,  gender  studies,  postcolonial  studies,  or 
elsewhere are ruptured. The achievement of the Utopian project of a world that 
we want is  brought  closer when we learn how and why to transform existing 
power relations in living otherwise. (p. 236-237)
Like his contemporary iconoclastic counterparts, Halpin and Giroux, Hall calls for people 
to turn to their real, local community efforts for indications of a utopian vision that is 
compatible  with  their  political  and ethical  views.  “New utopian visions”  Hall  (2009) 
promises:
are found in local community gardens, in community shared agricultural schemes, 
in individual and family choices to live more simple lives, in the large and still 
growing movement for ‘green economic development’, for social economies of 
varying kinds and in the literally millions of creative ideas that women and men 
are engaged in as ways to survive in a world which they do not like, yet know not  
how to change. (107-108)
These are the real projects that require investigation and extrapolation, as we can learn 
from those practices in which we are already involved. Hall wants people to explore their 
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own micro utopias to discern cultural phenomena worth perpetuating in the name of a 
new direction for utopia. This is how iconoclastic utopianism gets implemented through 
adult education, for Hall. 
More specifically, Hall has discussed this very phenomenon in the context of his 
theory of social movement learning, whereby direct and incidental knowledge that may 
contribute to the formulation of new utopian theories is acquired. Hall (2005) describes 
social  movement  learning  as,  "a)  learning  by  persons  who  are  part  of  any  social 
movement; and b) learning by persons outside of a social movement as a result of the 
actions taken or simply by the existence of social movements" (p. 6). By reflecting upon 
one’s experiences in a social movement and engaging in what Hall has called “cognitive 
praxis”,  one  can  keep  track  of  the  insightful  ideas,  effective  tactics,  and  productive 
behaviors  that  result  (Hall,  2005,  p.7).  This  knowledge  can,  in  turn,  generate  new 
directions for utopianism.
    If citizens can work together, using their creative and critical capacities, with a 
belief in their power to make a difference, a new utopian vision can begin to develop, 
according to Hall. The hope here is that with enough support, this new vision—a vision 
of the people—can overwhelm the free market utopia from within, creating a popular 
distaste for the McWorld vision. One thing Hall is certain of is that adult learning can 
play a  crucial  role  in  the  development  of  this  new utopian  vision—he remarks,  “the 
primary goal of adult education was to convince people of the possibility of change. All 
other goals can be achieved if we believe that change is possible” (p.109).
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Limitations of Iconoclastic Utopianism
    Iconoclastic utopianism is not all that different from blueprint utopianism in the 
sense  that  they both  share  a  purpose,  namely,  to  bring  about  societal  transformation 
toward a better future. However, as we have seen so far, there is a gap between what 
iconoclasts want to do and what the theoretical structure they have committed to will 
allow. In order to clarify, I will highlight the limited nature of each iconoclastic theory 
that I have articulated above, especially in relation to the theory from which they stem—
the blueprint. In doing so, I will rely heavily on the work of Darren Webb (2009) who has 
criticized iconoclastic utopian theories.
Blueprints  certainly  have  their  shortcomings,  as  I  outlined  in  Chapter  2.  The 
response to these shortcomings has been to offer an alternative utopianism. Iconoclastic 
utopian theories have become popular due to the fact that they allow utopians, liberals, 
educational policy theorists, and postmodernists to strike a compromise. Yet while the 
desire to please all parties is certainly an admirable one in and of itself,  I  argue that 
utopianism has sacrificed too much in this bargain. Prima facie, the iconoclastic theories 
of Halpin and Giroux are enticing; they prepare people to enact the change they’d like to 
see in the world. Giroux has made it plain that educated hope  is  his utopia: ‘educated 
hope as a form of utopianism’ and similarly, ‘utopian thinking as a form of educated 
hope’ (Giroux, 2001, p. 238, 245). Educated hope equips individuals with the sense of 
agency necessary to challenge dominant ideologies and seize their utopian aspirations. 
However, Giroux has also called for a more specific vision, although one has yet to be 
articulated, as Webb (2009) points out:
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Thus far, however, Giroux himself has refrained from developing such a vision. 
Aside from elastic phrases such as ‘radical democracy’ and ‘a future in which 
human beings realize their full potential’ (Giroux, 2001, p. 227), it is difficult to 
discern any substantive notion of what the good life might entail. This, of course, 
is wholly in keeping with his conviction that utopia needs to be ‘grounded’ and 
emergent rather than predetermined by privileged intellectuals. (p.753)
At bottom, Giroux’s utopianism goes no further than to create the potential for change.
Halpin’s theory of utopian realism also relies on the welling up of potential to lay 
his claim for change. Forgoing both the methodology and the absolute end of blueprint 
utopianism, Halpin takes heed of the criticisms of utopia. He defines utopian realism as, 
“a form of speculative reflection about an ideal world” (Halpin, 2001a, p. 115). He also 
defines utopianism as offering “radical challenges  to the status quo” and “out-of-the-
ordinary prospective images”(Halpin, 2003a, p. 37; Halpin, 2007, p. 243). Yet it becomes 
clear  through  his  own  real-world  example  of  utopian  realism  that  there  is  an 
inconsistency between his theory and his practice. Halpin’s example involves thinking 
that can bring about specific changes based on perceptions of realistic social trends—in a 
section entitled, "Thinking experimentally about school leadership", Halpin (2003) points 
his critical lens at a Catholic school he’d visited and proceeds to imagine a preferable 
scenario that is far from radical (p.77). Halpin focuses in on the issue of leadership, and 
using utopian realism, he questions how teaching can be improved at this school. The 
outcome of this thought experiment is to think of a teachers as exhibiting, “enthusiasm, 
direction,  effective  communication,  a  ‘can-do’  approach,  high  expectations,  humor, 
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respect for others, trust and willingness to delegate” (Webb, 2009, p.748). The output of 
utopian realism in this  case certainly meets the first  part  of the definition relating to 
“speculative  reflection  about  an  ideal  world”  but  expecting  a  teacher  to  exhibit 
“enthusiasm” is hardly the mark of a radical utopian theory.
The inability of Halpin’s own example to fulfill the aims of his concept has to do, 
Webb (2009) argues, with the absence of a concrete vision in Halpin’s theory:
That  utopian  realism  eschews  such  a  detailed  vision  of  the  social  whole  is 
explained in large part by a fear of ‘totalising’ discourse and its associations with 
‘totalitarianism’. To construct a ‘total’ vision of an alternative society is to offer a 
‘blueprint’, which then, so the logic goes, renders one complicit in a process of 
totalitarian coercion. But for Utopia to perform the functions ascribed to it  by 
Halpin, a blueprint is required. (p.748-749)
This inability for iconoclastic theories to meet the high standards of utopianism does not 
stop at Giroux and Halpin. Hall’s view also displays such shortcomings.
For Hall, the problem arises from the issue that changes in thought do not always 
become  changes  in  the  world.  The  idea  that  changes  in  thought  precipitate  desired 
changes in action or that theory necessarily leads to practice have not survived modern 
sociological inquiry. Positive thinking does not always beget positive action or positive 
results, despite the urging of many “McWorld” gurus. In fact, many argue that all this 
positive  thinking  keeps  people  from doing  precisely  what  they  intend  to:  enact  real 
change. Through critical thinking, hope, the investigation of the pre-existing community 
projects and collective deliberation, Hall believes that the utopian aim of transforming the 
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dominant paradigm and its practices is feasible. The implication being that this formula 
can provoke major social change.
Hall is certainly clear on his disdain for the current global market utopian vision. 
His critique is strong and his strategy is clearly stated. Nonetheless, without a design 
proposal for some sort of actual change or the assertion of some sort of positive ideal, he 
diminishes the ability of such change to come to global fruition. Relying on community 
after community to potentially enact his formula may eventually result in some sort of 
change, but it this is clearly a less efficient utopian strategy. In fact, at best, it advances at 
the pace of any tinkering-towards-utopia style reform. It would seem that in the absence 
of  a  strong  blueprint-utopianism  style  foundation,  one  of  the  few  remaining  active 
ingredients in an iconoclastic utopian recipe is hope.
This is not to deny its usefulness entirely. Iconoclastic utopianism might serve to 
catalyze critical thinking and public deliberation, as well as allow for diverse groups of 
students to empathize with one another. If successful, this exercise will undoubtedly have 
positive social repercussions. In theory, it can solve the finite problems to which it is 
applied. In a closed and directed effort, the aim is clearly defined and the expectations are 
limited. The use of a utopian thought process to accomplish a finite and predefined goal, 
in this case, facilitating cross-cultural communication, is a feasible one, and one that can 
be replicated for an innumerable number of local problems with finite goals. This is one 
way utopianism can become a method rather than a goal, as Ruth Levitas (2010) has 
argued.  
Yet there is still something unsatisfying about this modest vision. The original 
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utopian impulse is one that compels people to critique the status quo, formulate ideals, 
and strategize for change. Utopian blueprints offer step-by-step instructions as to how to 
arrive at the ideal state—an explanation of how the change will take place, a description 
of the end-state, and a description of how the achieved ideals should manifest themselves 
in the structure of society. Iconoclastic utopianism involves objecting to the current state 
of affairs and using objections and ideals to incite change, but offers no distinct plan, no 
universal set of ideals or projection of the best possible world. Iconoclastic utopianism 
picks up from where the world is and tries to improve it.
Iconoclastic utopianism rests on possibility. This structure is open, inclusive, and 
inoffensive—the postmodern dream. The qualities are undoubtedly of great value to any 
liberal-democratic,  pluralist  society.  As  such,  iconoclastic  utopianism  may  serve  a 
purpose  for  society,  but  let  us  not  pretend  it  fills  the  same  shoes  as  blueprints.  In 
managing to satisfy critics, iconoclasts dismiss the value of asserting universal ideals and 
envisioning a world that embodies them. Iconoclastic utopianism, as Halpin, Giroux, and 
Hall have elaborated it, makes no more radical demand than reformists do.
The fact remains, however, that the iconoclast’s criticisms of blueprint utopianism 
are  valid.  Without  proper  management,  as  the  critics  argue,  such  efforts  can  turn 
dystopian.  Abandoning strong ideals,  however,  is  no more the solution to  preventing 
dystopia than abandoning hope is the solution to preventing disappointment. Excessive 
idealism can indeed be a risk if put into practice without proper precaution and attention 
to reality. Blueprints also require we wipe our sociological and contextual slates clean 
and plan with no regard for history. This, in my view, is the blueprint’s most detrimental 
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feature. In failing to give proper credit to context, the blueprint neglects the wisdom that 
history, knowledge and experience can bring to new formulations. In addition, without 
due regard for history and present contexts, blueprints err on the side of being irrelevant 
and out of touch with the evolving needs and desires of people. To be clear, the direction 
I believe utopianism needs to go in is not back to exclusive reliance on blueprints.
Iconoclastic  utopianism  can  serve  a  valuable  social  purpose,  but  it  fails  to 
maximize the original potential of utopianism and one that is still dear to many a utopian 
theorist.  If  education  limits  its  utopian  inquiries  to  the  purview  of  the  iconoclastic 
framework, than I fear that we will never overcome the doubt that I expressed at the 
outset  of  this  thesis  about  whether  education  can really transform society.  Insofar  as 
iconoclastic  utopianism  holds  imagining  above  planning  and  holds  temporary,  local 
needs above universal ones, utopianism will continue to disappoint.
The  iconoclastic  view  should  not  be  discarded  altogether.  Instead,  it  can  be 
strengthened  to  have  a  greater  transformative  impact  on  society.  This  strengthening 
entails  buttressing  iconoclastic  utopianism  with  a  set  of  universal  ideals.  To  do  so 
requires taking what is, for some, a controversial ethical and methodological step. It is, 
however,  one  that  I  believe  will  bring  us  closer  to  making  the  ambitious  social 
transformations  necessary  to  truly  stave  off  the  ills  of  globalization.  It  is  this 
strengthening that I explore in the following section, though only very briefly. I do hope 
to eventually elaborate on this new direction at greater length in future work.
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Considerations for a New Direction for Utopianism
    In this section, I will offer only a brief indication as to the direction I believe 
utopianism needs to start heading in if it is to live up to its purpose. This exploration 
requires a much more in-depth look, but I would like to at least intimate at its structure 
here.  First,  I  will argue that utopian theory needs universalism if it  is to optimize its 
potential  for  social  transformation.  Second,  I  will  refer  to  Martha  Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach in order to demonstrate that there is a compelling and recent case 
already being made  for  particular  universal  ideals.  Lastly,  I  will  discuss  the  utopian 
strategy I believe to be worthy of further educational exploration—namely, a two-tiered 
utopian approach. This approach uses a foundation of universal ideals to strengthen the 
iconoclastic utopian formula for social transformation. 
Why Utopian Theory Needs Universalism
The desire to overcome criticisms of utopia and avoid dystopian outcomes has 
resulted in a diluted and substantially weaker utopianism: iconoclastic utopianism. This 
alternative offers no universal ideals or prescriptions for arriving at utopian society as 
blueprints  did,  ridding utopianism of  its  most  radical  and transformative  ingredients. 
Webb (2009) echoes this sentiment when he explains:
At the same time, however, educationalists are wary of approaches to policy and 
pedagogy  that  are  naïve  and  fanciful  or  rigidly  doctrinaire  and  potentially 
coercive.  Because of a  lingering suspicion that  utopianism can be all  of these 
things, the rehabilitation of Utopia within educational studies has been cautious 
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and restrained. In particular, those striving to revitalize the spirit of Utopia have 
sought  to  avoid  offering  ‘totalistic’  blueprints  and  advocating  prescriptive 
‘closure’. (p.755-756)
The aim of utopian theory as a formula for transforming society becomes an increasingly 
distant objective when universal ideals are eschewed. As Webb (2009) argues:
much of the vitality, power and direction that a utopian approach can offer has 
been  lost  as  a  consequence  of  the  perceived  need  to  circumvent  its  ‘bad’ 
connotations...if Utopia is to perform the functions ascribed to it then a holistic 
vision imbued with prescriptive content is necessary. Without these, the concept 
of utopia becomes emaciated. (p.756)
This becomes evident in the cases of Halpin and Giroux. Although it is more radical in 
terms of the critique that it claims to offer, Halpin’s utopian realism is, in many respects, 
practically indistinguishable from the kind of piecemeal approach preferred by Tyack and 
Cuban. Likewise, Giroux’s utopianism “threatens to get lost in an endless romanticisation 
of the student voice” (Webb, 2009, p.756). The outcome of reflection and discussion are 
a far stretch from that of planning, preparing and acting. Relying on utopian change to 
result from collective thought and good will is “utopian”, in the pejorative sense of the 
word. In each of the cases of iconoclastic utopianism that I have discussed above, be it 
that of Halpin,  Giroux, or Hall,  “the concept of utopia takes as an end what a  more 
substantive understanding of the concept would regard as a means” (Webb, 2009, p.756). 
For example, for Giroux, deliberation is an end, whereas in the case of Plato’s utopian 
theory, it was a means to the greater ideal of Justice. Iconoclastic utopianism, in many 
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ways,  justifies  the popular  connotation of  “utopian”  as  a  far-off  dream. Without  real 
tactics, plans for action, and assertive ideals, all that is left is hope. True, hope is a much-
needed psychological resource, but when it is not accompanied by plans and strategies for 
practical implementation, it becomes as ineffective as wishing.  
If it is to actually achieve its grand aims, the direction utopianism needs to move 
in is toward strong values and bold visions. One way to construct utopian theories of this 
kind is to ground them in universal, irreducible principles, protecting utopianism from a 
debilitating  intangibility.  In  much  the  same  way  that  we  protect  democracies  with 
constitutions, I postulate that we begin to explore protecting utopianism with a particular 
set of universal ideals. Affirming universal human values or ideals is a strategy that can 
justify hoping for  real  change,  as  it  can allow for  substantial  steps  toward a  utopian 
society to be taken. Without concrete visions, Webb (2009) has argued that we are left 
with utopianism as an “open-ended process of imaginative exploration,  a  critical  and 
heuristic device rather than a closed prescriptive goal to be realised through instrumental 
action” (p.756).
A utopianism built  upon universal ideals has been problematic in the past but 
perhaps there are ideals that may pose less of a danger than others. I submit that Martha 
Nussbaum has articulated a list of capabilities that may serve as viable and safe ideals for 
future utopian theorizing.
Martha Nussbaum’s Universal Capabilities
If  utopian  theories  are  to  begin  incorporating  universal  ideals  again,  then  I 
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propose  that  the  one  such  viable  set  of  ideals  is  that  put  forward  by  the  human 
development ethics of Martha Nussbaum. This direction involves using a set of universal 
ideals to produce a society where every individual has an opportunity to fulfill their basic 
needs  and  flourish.  Nussbaum’s  (2011)  capabilities  approach  asserts  a  minimum-
requirement of ideals in order to establish a dignified human existence for all. She (2011) 
also specifically demands that a minimum threshold the central capabilities be reached in 
order  to  claim a  state  of  minimal  justice.  The capabilities  approach is  an  interesting 
candidate  for  utopian  ideals  because  it  asserts  universal  ideals  on  the  basis  of  basic 
human needs and human flourishing. These needs are established by virtue of an appeal 
to  a cross-cultural  sense of human dignity and provide a plurality of specified ideals 
rather than a singular, abstract ideal (such as Justice, for example). Affirming specified 
ideals can work to prevent the false interpretation of ideals, which has often been the 
cause of utopian perversion or dystopia. 
In her latest articulation of the approach, Nussbaum enumerates the capabilities 
she believes are required for a dignified human life but does not claim to be offering a 
comprehensive list. These capabilities, I argue, can serve as universal ideals upon which a 
utopian theory maybe predicated; in fact, this would appear to be Nussbaum’s intention 
for the approach. Nussbaum (2009) lists the central human capabilities on which human 
development is focused:
life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the development of senses, imagination, and 
thought, the development of practical reason, emotional health, the opportunity to 
participate in meaningful and respectful relationships with others, both personal 
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and political, the opportunity to have a good relationship to the environment and 
the  world  of  nature,  the  chance  to  play and enjoy recreational  activities,  and 
finally, some specific types of control of property and one's working conditions. 
(p.11)
If these ideals were to be implemented, few could argue with the fact that this would a 
better world. Furthermore, with these human entitlements in place, Nussbaum (2009) can 
identify the role education is to play in securing them:
 It [education] must, first, promote the human development of its students. And it 
must,  second,  promote  the  students’  understanding  of  the  goals  of  human 
development for all, as goals inherent in the very idea of a decent minimally just 
society – in such a way that when they are empowered to make political choices, 
they will  foster  these  capabilities  for  all,  not  only for  themselves.  So,  in  my 
version, such an education will begin from the idea of equal respect for all human 
beings and equal entitlement of all to a range of central human opportunities, not 
just in one’s own nation, but everywhere in the world. (p.11)
Implementing the Capabilities Approach both requires education and advances the aims 
of most any ideal education. For example, ensuring equal respect for all human beings 
can certainly facilitate classroom dynamics,  inter-student relations etc.  Another of the 
Capabilities  Approach’s interesting implications  for education is  contained within the 
extended explanation of the fourth central capability:
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, 
think,  and  reason  –  and  to  do  these  things  in  a  ‘‘truly human’’  way,  a  way 
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informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means 
limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to 
use  imagination  and  thought  in  connection  with  experiencing  and  producing 
works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. 
Being able to  use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of 
expression  with  respect  to  both  political  and  artistic  speech,  and  freedom of 
religious  exercise.  Being  able  to  have  pleasurable  experiences  and  to  avoid 
nonbeneﬁcial pain. (Nussbaum, 2003, p.41)
Here education is conceived of as a means to developing one of the central and necessary 
capabilities. From this and the former example, it can be inferred that the Capabilities 
Approach  and  education  have  a  symbiotic  relationship.  Just  as  education  can  help 
implement  and fortify the promises  of the Nussbaum’s approach,  education,  too,  can 
benefit greatly from doing so. 
 Might such a view be conceived as containing the seeds of a utopian educational 
theory? Might realistic education ideals be derived from the central capabilities? What’s 
clear, at this point, is that many interesting implications for education, beyond that which 
I  have  briefly  referred  to  above,  can  be  gathered  from Nussbaum’s  principles.  The 
potential  for a utopian theory that  includes  universal principles,  such as Nussbaum’s, 
remains to be further explored.   
Until such theories have been articulated and can stand on their own ground, a 
compromise is  in  order between iconoclasts  and universalists.  Thus far,  a utopianism 
built upon universal ideals alone has not been well received by liberals, reformists and 
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postmodernists.  However,  perhaps  there  is  some  way  to  reconcile  these  competing 
theories into a single utopian theory for future education inquiry.
A Two-tiered Theory of Utopianism
I propose an alternative structure for utopian theories—one that combines both a 
set  of  universal  ideals,  such  as  Nussbaum’s  central  capabilities,  with  an  open  and 
exploratory  iconoclastic  strategy.  Universals  establish  a  minimum-requirement  for 
positive social transformation; they make a demand, whereas the iconoclastic strategy 
invites a conversation. Both of these strategies, I argue, need to be included in a strong 
utopian theory.  Or,  at  the  very least,  an aggressive push for  achieving the minimum 
thresholds of each capability, combined with the creativity of the iconoclastic strategy, is 
worthy of further consideration from philosophers of education.
 The  universal  foundation  of  this  combined  utopian  theory  can  act  as  an 
evaluative  standard  for  education,  and  the  iconoclastic  overlay can  act  as  a  tool  for 
considering yet additional improvements. The universal ideals or principles specified by 
Nussbaum  are  not  an  exhaustive  list—ideally,  additional  minimum-requirement 
principles  for  a  utopian  society  can  be  identified  through  iconoclastic  means.  For 
example,  a  combined  theory  might  first  assert  the  principle  of  gender-equality  in 
education.  In  doing  so,  the  principle  should  pervade  educational  policy,  curriculum, 
resources (ie. textbooks), the professional development guidelines of educational workers 
etc. With this principle established and implemented, the iconoclastic tier serves to assess 
and improve the quality of the implementation of the principle and amend it if need be. 
90
The  layer  of  iconoclastic  utopianism  considers  the  voices  of  those  affected  by  the 
principle  and upon reflection and collective  deliberation,  additional  principles  can be 
asserted and existing principle can be perfected. The two-tiered or combined formula for 
educational utopia is meant to be equal parts assertive and contemplative.
Education, many would argue, is a necessary requirement for human flourishing. 
While Nussbaum’s list is helpful in allowing me to articulate this structure for utopian 
theory,  I use it  here more as a viable example of what is possible rather than as  the 
answer to our concerns in he field of education. Can a list of minimum-requirements such 
as the central capabilities be formulated to reflect our hopes for education? Certainly, 
without the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list being met, it becomes difficult to imagine 
how one might flourish in an educational environment. In fact, Nussbaum (2011) assures 
us that as more capabilities begin to be identified by communities, she anticipates that 
education will be first among them:
To some extent, the fertile capabilities will themselves be context-specific, but it's 
a good bet that in all nations education is one of them, providing access not only 
to employment options and political voice but also to greater bargaining power in 
the household, hence the power to stand up for oneself. (p.98)
Education is an opportunity that creates more opportunities. In this way, it would seem 
that a combined utopian advancement takes place not in the hard and fast manner of 
implementing a blueprint, nor in the long and slow revolution of the iconoclastic strategy, 
but as a progressive and steadfast unfolding. 
I  have encountered few educators  who have not  bemoaned the passing of  the 
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Millennium Development Goals deadline. The Education For All goals are now a hugely 
motivating factor for petitioning for more aggressive strategies for transformation. This is 
not to overlook or belittle what progress has been made toward them. Rather, it  is to 
emphasize that time is of the essence. I take this opportunity to implore members of the 
educational  community  to  direct  their  inquiries  in  the  direction  of  more  demanding 
strategies for change, as I offer here. If incorporating universalism into a utopian theory 
of  education  can  be  viable  and  effective  way  of  making  ideals  a  reality  then 
pragmatically, it is a timely risk to take.    
Concluding Remarks
The reasons for which critics argue that we should not be offering strong utopian 
theories  involves  the  historically  grounded  fear  of  totalitarianism,  the  claim  of 
inefficiency and the postmodern fear of universalism. As a result, iconoclastic utopianism 
has  emerged  as  a  contemporary  alternative  that  allows  for  theorists  to  circumvent 
criticisms and still uphold a utopian theory. However, as I have shown, this version of 
utopia is much less ambitious. This is not to say that it does not make a noteworthy effort 
for  societal  improvement.  Rather,  it  is  to  say  that  the  horizon  of  transformative 
achievement possible under iconoclastic utopianism is weakened by its refusal to assert 
universal ideals. I do not recommend we return to formulating blueprints. They recklessly 
abandoned social contexts and they affirmed the political ideals of authoritarians. Instead, 
I suggest that we begin to think in terms of a two-tiered utopianism. This utopianism 
consists of a universalist foundation made up of ideals that I propose be derived from 
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Martha  Nussbaum’s  account  of  human  functioning,  with  an  overlay  of  iconoclastic 
utopianism.  Such  a  theory  makes  a  forceful  plea  for  social  transformation.  It  also 
necessitates collective and contextually relevant deliberation in order to sustain forward 
movement toward utopia.
From this, it may be gathered that the vision of utopia I point to here is at the very 
least a society where each individual has a strong framework in which to flourish. This 
might not sound like the ambitious utopian visions of the past, but it would seem that we 
live in a world where this kind of justice is nearly as distant as perfection. To deem this 
utopian vision a “pie-in-the-sky” variety would be to instantiate an all-new pessimistic 
low—the impossibility of justice.
If an ideal education is one where each student has a strong social and educational 
framework in which to flourish, then it is time that we, in education, consider formulating 
our  own ideals  that  might  enable  this  opportunity.  If  there  is  one  thing  that  Halpin, 
Giroux, and Hall are all right about, it is that we in the field of education need to think of 
it as our responsibility and central purpose to construct a system whereby each student, 
adult or child has a good context in which to flourish.
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